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.. Intx.:o..duc.tion 
The  aim  of  the  work  reported here  is to  assess  the likely 
economic  effects of  reducing  barrier~ to  trade within the 
European  community  in  a  range  of  industries  in which  there may 
be  significant economies  of  scale.  The  projections are based 
on  a  formal  partial equilibrium model  of  international  trade  in 
imperfectly competitive markets.  A  model  of this nature may 
capture  two  effects of  completing the  internal  EC  market: 
increased exploitation of  economies  of  scale,  and  the potential 
effects of  market  liberalisation on  competition. 
The  next  section presents  a  simple  example  of  a  model  of 
international  trade under  imperfect  competition,  in  an  attempt 
to  give  a  reasonably simple  account of  the essential nature  of 
the  more  complex  model  used to produce  the projections  in· this 
report.  A  full  description of  the  actual  model  used  (which  is 
a  development  of  the  model  described in Venables  and  Smith 
(1986))  is provided in  a  technical  appendix. 
section  2  then describes  the data to which  the  model  is 
applied;  and  section  3  the  "calibration"  of  the  model  to  the 
data. 
In section  4  the  results of  one  policy experiment  are 
described:  a  reduction  in  intra-EC trade barriers equivalent  to 
a  reduction  in the cost of  intra-EC trade of  2.5%.  The  effects 
on  trade,  output,  production costs  and  economic  welfare are 
determined.  Section  5  considers  the sensitivity of  the results 
to  changing our  assumptions  about  firms'  behaviour. 
section  6  describes  the results of  a  more  dramatic  change 
in  the  intra-EC market  structure,  where  in addition to the 
reduction  in trade barriers,  it is  assumed  that firms  are  no 
longer  able  to  charge different prices  in different national 
markets  within  the  EC.  This  shift to  an  "integrated"  market 
produces  substantially larger economic  effects than  the earlier 
policy experiment . 
.  l ....................... .Mo..de.lling  ....... t.r.ade  ....... unde.r.  ...... ilm..er.f~e.c.t  ....... c.QJDP.e.t.i.t.ia.n 
The  full  model  on  which  this exercise was  based is set out 
in the  technical  appendix.  It may,  however,  be helpful  to see 
some  of  the  essential  economic  features  of  that model  displayed 
in  a  simpler  example.  Accordingly,  as  an  introduction to  the 
modelling exercise,  in this section we  present an  artificially 
simple  example  of  trade  under  imperfect  competition.  we  also 
discuss  some  further  aspects  of  the modelling of  imperfect· 
competition. 
suppose  that there  are  two  countries with  identical 
demands  for  a  particular homogeneous  good.  Let  the  demand  y  in 
either country be  given by  the  following  function  of  the 
consumer  price  p  (in  $) 
y  = lOOOOp-2 -5-
which  implies  that the elasticity of  demand  is  2.  The  inverse 
demand  function  is 
p  = 100y-1/2 
Let  the cost of producing quantity x  of  the  good be 
c  = 7x  +  111 
which  implies  that the  average  cost is  a  decreasing 
function  of  output,  so  there  are  economies  of scale.  suppose 
that  a  firm  receives  the  consumer price P1  in respect of  sales 
in respect of  sales  in its home  market,  but receives P2(1-t) 
from  a  unit sold in its foreign  market,  where  the  fraction  t 
represents  the cost of selling across  the border.  Then  the 
profits of  a  firm  which sells x1  at home  and  x2  abroad will be 
n  =  P1X1  +  P2(1-t)x2  - 7(X1+X2)  - 111 
If the  firm  chooses  x1  and  x2  in the belief that the sales 
to both markets  of all other  firms  are  fixed,  then 
differentiation of its profit function  gives rise to  two 
equations describing its optimal  sales decisions  in the 
respective markets 
P1(1-s1/2)  =  7 
(1-t)p2(1-s2/2)  =  7 
where  the left hand  side of  each equation is the marginal 
revenue  in the  respective market,  the right hand  side is 
marginal  cost,  and si is the  firm's  share of  the  respective 
market.  Note  how  marginal  revenue  depends  both  on  the 
elasticity of  demand  and  on  the market  share. 
If t=0.2  and there  are  two  firms  in each  country,  then  the 
outcome  of profit maximising behaviour by  the  four  firms  will 
be  a  price of  $9  in both countries,  production of  5000/81  units 
of output by  each  firm,  of which  8/9  is sold in its home  market 
and  1/9  exported.  Each  firms  then has  4/9  of  its home  market 
and  1/18 of  its export market.  It is easily checked that the 
firms'  profit-maximising equations  are satisfied and that 
supply equals  demand  in both markets  at this price.  It is also 
the  case that firms'  profits are virtually zero,  so  this is  a 
long-run equilibrium. 
If now  t  were  reduced to  zero,  it is easily checked that 
if the  four  firms  remain  in existence,  the price charged will 
fall  to  $8,  and production of  each  firm will rise to  5000/64, 
of  which half is sold in each  market  (so  firms'  shares  of their 
home  market  falls  from  4/9  to  1/4  and of  their export  markets 
rises  from  1/18  to  1/4).  There  is  a  gain of  consumer  surplus 
of  almost  $139  in  each  of  the  two  countries  as  a  result of  the 
price reduction,  and  each  of  the  four  firms  suffers  losses  of 
almost  $33;  so  in  aggregate  the  reduction  in trade costs brings 
about  a  rise  in welfare.  The  price  reduction  is very much -6-
greater than the  reduction  in trade costs because  the  main 
effect of  the  change  is that increased competition  from  imports 
considerably reduces  the market  power  that  firms  have  in their 
home  markets  and drives  down  prices. 
The  fact  that  firms  are making  losses  implies  that they 
will wish  to exit  from  the  industry.  It is easily checked that 
if one ·firms  exits  (and  since there  are  now  no  trade costs,  the 
nationality of  the  exiting firm  is irrelevant)  then  the 
remaining  three  firms  increase their output to  approximately 
5000/53,  enjoy  lower  costs,  and make  positive profits of  just 
over  $21  each.  The  price to  consumers  is higher at $8.40  than 
with  four  firms,  and  the  consumer  surplus  gain is therefore 
lowered  to  a  little over  $79,  and  the  aggregate welfare  gain at 
approximately  $222  in total exceeds  the welfare  gain of  $146  in 
the previous  case. 
This  example,  simple  though it is,  illustrates some  of  the 
main  features  of  the  empirical  model  which  follows.  However, 
there is more·involved  in what  we  do  below  than  a 
straightforward generalisation of  the  above  example  to 
encompass  six countries,  larger numbers  of  firms,  and real 
world data. 
The  principal  feature of  the model  we  have  used which  is 
not  illustrated in the  above  example  is product 
differentiation:  consumers  having preferences between different 
varieties of  the  same  product.  This  introduces  two  features 
into the  model  (both of which  are discussed further  in section 
3  below):  firms  have  to  choose  the  number  of varieties to 
produce;  and  their ability to set prices  for  individual 
varieties means  that their marginal  revenue  now  depends  not 
just on  market  share  and  on  the elasticity of  demand  for  the 
product  as  a  whole  (as  in the  above  example),  but  also  on  the 
elasticity of  demand  for  the  individual variety. 
casual  empiricism  suggests  that product differentiation is 
an  important  feature  of  the markets  for  many  manufactured 
products,  and  (as  is explained in section 3  below)  the data we 
use  in our modelling give  strong support  to this view.  The 
introduction of product differentiation thus  enriches  as well 
as  complicates  the model. 
There  are  two  further distinctions which play a  role  in 
the paper but  are not explicitly illustrated in the  example 
above. 
The  first is the distinction between  "Cournot"  and 
"Bertrand"  competition.  In  the  example  we  assumed  that each 
firms  supposed  that other firms'  .s..a.l.e  .  .s  were  given when  it 
decided how  much  to sell;  and  this is the  cournot hypothesis. 
An  alternative,  the Bertrand hypothesis,  would be  to  assume 
that  firms  set their prices  on  the  assumption that other  firms 
.P.r  .. i.c..e.s.  are  given.  It is not  very illuminating to  look  at the 
Bertrand hypothesis  in  the  above  example  because,  in the 
absence  of  product differentiation,  Bertrand pricing -7-
degenerates  to pr1c1ng at marginal  cost.  However,  in models 
with product differentiation,  Bertrand behaviour is compatible 
with  imperfect  competition,  though it still leads  to 
substantially more  competitive pricing than  does  Cournot 
behaviour.  We  suggest below that the Cournot hypothesis  may  be 
the  more  attractive in  the  weight  that it places  on  market 
shares  as  a  determinant of  firms'  behaviour. 
The  second distinction plays  a  more  crucial role  in our 
results.  In  the  example  above,  the  removal  of trade barriers 
had  a  very dramatic  effect on  the  competitive structure of  the 
model.  We  shifted from  an  equilibrium  in which  each market  was 
dominated by  two  domestic  firms  with  a  small  fringe  of 
importers  to  an  equilibrium  in which  all four  firms  (or after 
exit,  all three  firms)  had equal  market  shares.  Effectively 
the  two  markets,  which previously were .  .s..e..gm_en.t.e.d,  now  behave  as 
if they were  a  single ..  in~t.e,g.r  .. a.t.e.d  market.  In  the presence of 
product differentiation,  removal  of  trade costs might  not be 
sufficient to produce  this .outcome  (consumers  might,  for 
example,  have  genuine preferences  for  home-produced varieties 
which  give  firms  larger shares of home  markets  than of  foreign 
markets).  Further,  without product differentiation,  it is not 
possible to make  the market  integrated other than by setting 
trade costs  to  zero.  In  the model  with product 
differentiation,  however,  it is possible without  setting trade 
costs  to  zero  to consider the effect of  imposing  on  firms  the 
requirement  that they do  not price discriminate between markets 
and  charge  the  same  factory-gate price to all consumers  (though 
consumers  in foreign markets still have  to pay  the  trade cost 
on  top  of  the  uniform  factory-gate price).  This  sort of policy 
has  the  same  sort of  strongly pro-competitive effect,  even with 
positive trade costs,  as  did the  removal  of all trade costs  in 
the  example  above,  and  for essentially the  same  reason:  once 
firms  look  on  the market  as  being  a  single integrated market, 
the market  power  that was  conferred on  them  by asymmetrically 
large home  market  shares  is diminished.  The  single most 
striking result that we  describe below is that  a  policy which 
succeeded in making  firms  act  on  an  EC-wide  integrated market 
basis  is likely to have  much  larger welfare effects  than  a 
policy which  simply  reduces border barriers  . 
.  2  ....................... Mode.l  ...... co.v.:e.r.age  ....... .and  ...... d.a.t.a  ...... s.o.u~c.e.s 
The  model  treats  the  world market  for  a  product  as  being 
divided  into six "countries":  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Italy,  the  UK,  the rest of  the  EC,  and  the rest of  the 
world.  The  model  has  been  applied to  the  following  selection 
of  three digit  NACE  industries: 
242  cement,  lime  and plaster 
257  pharmaceutical  products 
260  artificial  and  synthetic  fibres 
322  machine  tools  .. 
330  office machinery 
342  electric motors,  generators,  transformers, 
346  electrical household  appliances (2) 
-8-
351  motor  vehicles  and  engines 
438  carpets,  carpeting,  oilcloth,  linoleum,  .. 
451  footwear 
These  sectors were  chosen  as  a  relatively heterogeneous 
group  of  industries,  for all of which  some  estimates  of 
economies  of  scale are  available,  and  some  of which  might  be 
relatively strongly affected·by the  completion of  the  European 
market,  e.g.  because  of  the role of public procurement  or 
technical  standards. 
Data  on bilateral international trade  flows  between  these 
"countries"  in each of  the  ten sectors listed above  was 
obtained  from  the Eurostat NACE-CLIO  trade tables  for  1982. 
Domestic  production statistics for  the  EC  countries were 
obtained  from  the Eurostat Annual  Indust·rial  survey. 
Unfortunately,  production data  for  the rest of the  EC  seem 
quite unreliable  and  for  the rest of  the world  are unavailable. 
For  each  industry,  therefore,  values  were  chosen  for production 
in these  "countries"  that gave  them  approximately the  same 
ratio of production to total exports  (for the rest of  the  EC) 
or to exports  to the  EC  (for the rest of  the world)  as  the 
average  for  the  four  individually identified EC  countries. 
These  numbers  were  required to complete  the model;  and  the  fact 
that  they-were  estimated in  a  fairly arbitrary way  means  that 
great caution should be  exercised in interpreting results 
relating to  the  rest of  the  EC  or  the  rest of  the world. 
(Data  for  exports by the rest of  the world  to  the  EC  were 
not  available  in the  NACE-CLIO  export tables  and values  were 
derived  from  the  import  tables,  adjustments being made  for 
observed systematic discrepancies between  export  and  import 
data. ) 
Even  though  the  trade data  are classified by nace-clio, 
and  even  after the  above  adjustments,  there  remained evident 
problems  in reconciling the trade  and production data, 
presumably  largely arising  from  the  fact that the  trade data 
refer to  commodities  classified to  the  relevant nace-clio 
groups  while  the production data refer to  firms  (though  the 
treatment of  re-exports  is another potential source of 
discrepancies).  Apparent  domestic  consumption of  domestically 
produced goods  was  calculated by subtracting the value of 
exports  from  the value of production,  but  in three cases 
(office  equipment  (330)  in the  UK,  and  carpets  (438)  and 
footwear  (451)  in Italy)  this  gave  a  negative  number.  An 
arbitrary adjustment was  made  to  the  domestic  production  figure 
to bring domestic  consumption  into  approximately the  same 
relation to trade  flows  as  for  the other countries. 
The  first table  in each section of  Table  1  gives  the six-
by-six matrix of  trade  and  consumption  flows  derived for  each 
of  the  ten  industries  from  the  1982  data.  Each  row  of  the 
matrix refers  to  the production of  a  country;  and  each  column 
to  the  consumption  of  a  country. -9-
The  model  requires  an  estimate of  the  number  of  firms  in 
each  sector in each  country.  The  Eurostat .  .S.t.r.uc..t.ur.e.  ....... and 
.A.c.  .. t.i.v..i.t  .. Y  ....... o.f  ........ P  .. r.o.du.c  .. t  .. i.on  data  on  the  size distribution of  firms 
was  used  to calculate  a  Herfindahl  index of  concentration on 
the basis  of  which  may  be  calculated the  number  of 
"representative"  firms  in  each  country.  This  is the  number  of 
equal-sized firms  which  would  give rise to  the  same  effective 
degree  of  market  concentration  as  the  observed distribution of 
unequal-sized  firms.  These  numbers  are  reported for  each 
industry  in Table  1.  Again,  numbers  for  the  rest of  the  EC  and 
the  rest of  the  world have  had  to be  assumed,  to  make  firm  size 
equal  to  the  average  in the  four  individual  EC  countries. 
It is evident that many  of  the  ten nace-clio classes  are 
too  aggregated  to be  sensibly regarded as  covering  a  single 
industry  and  in most  cases  we  have  modelled  the  industry as 
being divided into  a  number  of  equal-sized subindustries.  For 
example,  in electrical household appliances  there  are  assumed 
to be  five  subindustries.  Effectively this  amounts  to 
describing  each  subindustry by  a  commodity  flow  matrix  and  a 
set of  firm  numbers  that  are  one  fifth of  the  numbers  reported 
in Table  1. 
The  model  requires  information  on  economies  of  scale,  and 
we  have  used  the  information provided by Pratten  (1987), 
summarising  much  of  that  information  into  two  numbers  for  each 
industry:  the  effect on  average  cost of  changing  the  output of 
each  of  the  individual product varieties of  a  firm  of  minimum 
efficient scale while  keeping  the  number  of varieties constant; 
and  the effect on  average  cost of  changing  the  number  of 
product varieties,  keeping output per variety constant.  The 
minimum  efficient scale is  taken  to be  the size of  the  average 
"representative"  firm  in  the  EC;  and where  Pratten provides 
independent  information on  this,  it seems  to  suggest  that this 
is not  an  unreasonable  assumption.  There  is  an  additional 
aspect of  scale economies  to consider:  the  form  of the cost 
function.  The  simplest  form  of  cost  function  giving rise to 
economies  of  scale is  the  "linear"  function  in which  there are 
fixed  costs  and  constant marginal  cost.  However,  in many 
industries it seems  possible that  economies  of scale would  take 
a  form  in which  marginal  cost  as  well  as  average  cost falls 
with  output,  and  the  simplest  form  of  function with this 
property is  the  "loglinear"  function,  which  is  a  linear 
function  of  the  logarithms  of  the variables.  In our model  we 
have  used  a  cost  function  which  is  a  weighted average  of  these 
two  forms  and  the weights  (based partly on  Pratten's 
information,  and partly on  casual  empiricism)  are  reported 
together with  the  other  two  scale  economy  numbers  in Table  1. 
Finally,  we  require  an  estimate of  the elasticity of 
demand  for  the product of  each  industry.  Here  our  sources  are 
Piggott  and  Whalley  (1985),  Deaton  (1975),  Houthakker  (1965) 
and  Houthakker  and Taylor  (1970),  and  the  numbers  we  use  are 
reported  in Table  1. -10-
1982  was  chosen  as  the base year  for  the projections 
because of  the  fact  that industrial  survey data  for later years 
is  incomplete.  Even  though  from  a  macroeconomic  viewpoint, 
1982  was  an  atypical  year  for  the  European  economy,  we  do  not 
think that this  fact will have  any  significant  impact  on  the 
general  nature of  the  results we  obtain  . 
.. 3  ... a.  ... "'''"'"'""'C.a.l.1.b.r.a.t.i.QD 
The  process  of  model  "calibration" consists of  finding  a 
set of  numerical  parameters  for  the  model  which  are consistent 
with  the  information presented in the previous  section. 
The  first requirement  is that  firms'  output decisions 
satisfy the  condition that marginal  revenue  in each of  the six 
markets  equal  the  marginal  cost of producing the  good.  The 
simplified model  of  section  1  shows  how  marginal  revenue 
depends  on  market  share  and  on  the elasticity of  demand  for  the 
product.  The  pattern of production  and  trade reported in Table 
1  cannot,  however,  be  described by  such  a  simple  model,  for it 
would  seem  that  firms  are not exploiting their scale  economies 
to  the  extent that they should.  The  model  used  (and described 
in more  detail  in the  technical  appendix)  introduces  an  element 
not present  in the model  of  section 1:  consumers  are  supposed 
to distinguish between  the different varieties of  the  same 
product.  Now  firms  choose  their sales  levels  taking  account  not 
only of  the effect of  their decision on  total supply of  the 
product  and  therefore  on  the price level  of  the product  in 
general,  but  also of  the effect that  a  change  in sales has  on 
the price that the  firm  can  charge  for  its own  specific variety 
of  the product.  Thus  for  each  industry we  calculate  an 
elasticity which  would  make  the data consistent with  the 
hypothesis  that the  firms  were  maximising profits in  a  market 
with differentiated products. 
our central case  is based on  a  "Cournot"  version of  the 
model  and  the  relevant elasticities are  reported in Table  1 
imm~diately below  "Cournot  calibration".  The  larger the 
elasticity the  less is the  degree  of product differentiation, 
and infinite elasticity corresponds  to  the  case  of ,no 
differentiation where  consumers  are  indifferent between 
different varieties.  Note  the contrast between,  say, 
pharmaceutical  products  (257)  and artificial and synthetic 
fibres  (260):  the  former  has  a  much  lower elasticity indicating 
a  higher degree  of product differentiation:  the difference 
simply reflects the  fact  that pharmaceutical  products  has  many 
more  firms  in spite of  having stronger economies  of  scale.  In 
most  cases,  the elasticities take  intuitively appealing values, 
though  office machinery  (330)  has  an  implausibly  low  degree  of 
apparent product differentiation.  (This  may  be  related to  the 
fact  that  in this  industry the data  for  the  UK  are not  very 
satisfactory and  the  skewed distribution of  firm  size  in Italy 
may  be  affecting the  estimate of  "representative"  firm  size.) -II-
Not  only will different firms'  products  be differentiated, 
but  one  firm  can produce  different product varieties.  There  is 
then  the  issue of  the  extent to which  we  treat large  firms  as 
selling large  numbers  of product varieties or  as  having  long 
production runs  of  individual varieties. ·In calibrating the 
data,  having  no  information on  this  issue,  we  let all the 
variation in  firm  size be  accounted for by  the  number  of  models 
produced by  firms  rather  than  by  l~ngth of  model  run,  so  as  to 
minimise  the  extent to which  differences between  firms  are 
introduced  into the model  without being based  on  good  evidence. 
In  our  central policy experiments,  we  suppose  that  firms  do  not 
change  the  number  of  models  that they produce,  but there  are 
some  experiments  in which  we  do  let firms  vary their model 
numbers.  In this event  we  need to have  firms'  model  numbers 
explained by profit-maximising choice:  where  firms  compare  the 
cost of  introducing  a  new  model  with  the extra  revenue  that 
will be  obtained in  .. all of  the  markets  in which it is sold. 
When  one  firm  makes  this decision it is  assumed to anticipate 
that other  firms  will react to  a  change  in its number  of 
models,  and  the  "model  conjectures"  reported in Table  1  are  the 
values  of  these  assumed  reactions  which  are consistent with  the 
data;  so,  for  example,  in the  case of artificial and synthetic 
fibres,  in  the cournot calibration each  firm  assumes  that  a  1% 
change  in  the  number  of its models  would bring about  a  0.02% 
change  in the  number  of  models  produced by all other firms. 
Finally,  we  have  to  find model  parameters  which  are 
consistent with  the large observed differences  in  firms'  share 
of  different national markets,  the  share of home  firms 
typically being very much  greater than  that of  foreign  firms. 
These  differences  may  be  the result of non-tariff  trade 
barriers  such  as  differences  in national  regulations,  of 
transport costs,  of differences  in distribution networks,  or of 
consumer  preference patterns.  we  suppose  that transport costs 
are at  an  .a.d.  ..... v.  .. alo.rHe.m  level of  10%  and  attribute the rest of  the 
difference to differences  in demand  functions  whose  effect is 
described in the  "tariff equivalent"  tables within Table  1. 
These  tables describe  the tariff-equivalent values  that non-
tariff barriers would  have  to have  if the underlying  consumer 
demands  for  goods  were  uniform  across different national 
producers  and  .. a.ll  of  the national bias  in the  observed trade 
pattern was  attributed to trade barriers.  (See  the  technical 
appendix  for  further details of  the  method of calculation.) 
A  "Bertrand"  version of  the  model  was  calibrated also,  and 
the elasticities and  model  conjectures  are  reported in Table  1, 
though  not  the  tariff-equivalents  (which  are different  from 
those of  the  cournot calibration,  but not  remarkably  so). 
Invariably,  the  model  elasticity is  lower  in this case  than  in 
the  cournot  case,  simply because  the cournot version of  the 
model  gives  more  weight  to market  shares  in the determination 
of marginal  revenue.  Bertrand behaviour by  firms  is inherently 
more  competitive  and  the  observed failure of  firms  fully to 
exploit their economies  of  scale has  to be  explained by  a 
higher degree  of  product differentiation  (lower  model 
elasticity)  and  by  more  pessimistic model  conjectures.  In  the -12-
cases  of  cement  (242)  and artificial fibres  (260),  the Bertrand 
calibration produces  an  implausibly high  degree of product 
differentiation.  we  choose  the cournot  case  for our central 
projections because,  even if it is based· on  too  simplistic  a 
model  to capture all of  the  complexity of  real world 
competitive  interaction,  it does  give  an  intuitively appealing 
weight  to  market  shares  in describing firms'  behaviour . 
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our first set of  policy experiments  is based on  a  very 
conservative  interpretation of what  is  involved in  "completing 
the  internal market":  the  intra-EC  implicit trade barriers are 
reduced equiproportionately so  as  to  reduce  trade costs by  2.5% 
of  the  value  of  intra-EC trade.  Thus  in the case of artificial 
fibre~,  all the tariff equivalents were  reduced by  13.5%,  while 
in electrical household.appliances,  where  the tariff 
equivalents  were  calibrated to be  much  higher,  a  6.6%  reduction 
in their value  reduced  trade costs by  2.5%.  (In the case of 
footwear,  where  the calibration suggested the  implicit barriers 
are  already quite  low,  a  2.5%  reduction produced  implausible 
effects,  and  we  have  modelled  the  reduction  as  being  1%.) 
The  figure  of  2.5%  could be  defended on  the basis of 
Winters's  estimate  (Pelkmans,  Wallace  and Winters,  1988)  that 
removal  of border measures  affecting intra-EC trade  should 
generate direct cost  savings  of  between  1%  and  3%  of  trade. 
However,  Winters  also notes  the existence of other distorting 
influences  on  trade,  such  as  public  procurement policies, 
subsidies  and national  standards,  so  our  figure  of  2.5%  could 
be  interpreted as  taking  a  pessimistic  view of  the 
possibilities of  substantial progress  in reducing  such 
distortions.  It should,  though,  be  noted that our results  can 
be  scaled proportionately to provide  approximate  estimates of 
the effects of  changes  in trade barriers different  from  the 
2.5%  reduction. 
The  effects projected by our  model  of this policy change 
are  summarised  for  each  of  the  ten  industries  in Table  2. 
cournot behaviour  is  assumed  and it is also  assumed that  firms 
do  not  change  the  size of  their model  ranges.  Two  sets of 
projections  are  reported:  one  for  the  case  in which  the  number 
of  firms  is  unchanged by  the policy;  and  the  second for  the 
case  in which  entry and exit of  firms  is  assumed  to  take place 
so  as  to  restore profits to  the  levels  in the base  case before 
the policy change. 
Consistently across  industries,  as  one  would  expect,  the 
first effect is to  increase  the  volume  of  intra-EC trade, 
whether  or not  the  number  of  firms  is constant.  With  a  given 
number  of  firms,  the  increased  import penetration makes  markets 
more  competitive  and  reduces  prices,  expands  sales,  raises 
consumer  surplus  and  {except  where  there  is  a  large  increase  in 
output)  reduces profits.  The  effect on  national output  is to 
reinforce existing differences  in trade patterns,  so,  for -13-
example,  in pharmaceuticals  (257)  the  UK  expands  and Italy 
contracts,  while  in electrical household appliances  (346)  Italy 
expands  and  the  UK  contracts.  The  consistent effect of  the 
output  changes  is to  reduce  the  EC  average  value  of  the  average 
cost of  production  in each  industry. 
When  the  number  of  firms  is allowed  to vary in response  to 
profit changes,  the usual  outcome  (with  the  exception of office 
machinery  (330)  in which  there  are  substantial  apparent 
differences  in the degree  of  concentration in different 
countries)  is for  there to be  a  reduction  in the total number 
of  EC  firms,  so  that average  cost falls  further  as  remaining 
firms  increase  in size.  Thus  in most  industries  (260,  330, 
346,  350,  for  example),  the  average  EC  price falls by more  when 
the  number  of  firms  is variable.  The  effect on  consumer 
surplus  is not  necessarily as  one  would expect  from  looking at 
prices  alone,  because  consumer  surplus  is affected also by the 
variety of products  available,  and  that changes with  the  number 
of  firms. 
Exit of  firms  tends  to raise concentration,  but  in the 
version of  the  model  used to generate  the projections presented 
here,  the price-cost markup  is calculated with the  number  of 
firms  unchanged.  The  rationale for  this procedure  is that, 
although  the  model  treats all  firms  in  a  country as  identical, 
in reality firms  differ in size  and  efficiency,  and exit of  the 
least efficient firms  should have little effect on  the 
remaining  firms'  perception of  the  intensity of  the  competition 
they  face.  (When  the model  is  run  with the alternative 
assumption  that exit is fully reflected in the  surviving firms' 
markups  the  results differ in  some  details  in  some  industries, 
but  the  overall pattern of  results  is not greatly changed.) 
Both with  firm  numbers  fixed  and variable,  there  are 
effects  on  extra-EC  trade  in all industries:  extra-EC  imports 
are  replaced as  the direct costs  of  intra-EC trade  are  reduced 
(trade diversion),  while  the  reduction of  EC  costs  and  increase 
in competitivity reduces  EC  prices,  expands  extra-EC exports  (a 
form  of  trade creation)  and  further  reduces  extra-EC  imports. 
The  key effect on  the  EC  as  a  whole  of  the policy change  across 
the  ten sectors  are  summarised  in Table  3  which  reports  for 
both variants of  the  model  the percentage  change  in output,  the 
percentage  change  in  average  cost,  the  change  in aggregate 
welfare  (consumer  surplus plus profit)  as  a  fraction of  the 
value  of  total  consumption  in  the base  case,  and  the ratio of 
welfare gain  to  intra-EC trade creation.  For  each  industry, 
Table  3  also  reports  some  key characteristics of  the  industry. 
e,  the  calibrated value of  the  individual  model  elasticity,  is 
high where  different varieties of  the product  are close 
substitutes  (as  in  242  and  451)  and  low where  there  is strong 
product differentiation  (as  in  257  and  342).  RS  gives  the 
increase  in  average  cost when  production  runs  are  reduced to 
half  their minimum  efficient scale,  so  that high values 
indicate the  existence of  strong economies  of  scale,  as  in  257 
and  350.  TS  gives  the  share  on  intra-EC trade  in  EC  consumption 
and  is  low  in  those  industries  (242  and  342)  which  seem  to· have -14-
high transport costs.  H is the  EC  average Herfindahl  index,  and 
is high  in concentrated industries  such  as  330  and  low  in 
industries with many  firms  such  as  342  and  451.  DC  is the 
direct cost saving associated with  the policy change,  expressed 
as  a  percentage of base  consumption. 
Table  3  shows  the  changes  in average  cost  and  the  changes 
in welfare  as  a  proportion of base  consumption  that result  from 
the policy change.  These  changes  are largest in industries  260, 
330,  and  350,  which  all have  significant returns  to scale .and  a 
high proportion of  output  traded within the  EC.  only in those 
industries,  with  free  entry/exit,  do  welfare gains  exceed  1%  of 
base  consumption.  It should also be  noted that the cost 
reduction  and welfare gain  are  larg~st when  there is entry and 
exit,  but  the effect of entry and exit is significant only  in 
the  more  concentrated industries  and is negligible or negative 
in 322,  342  and  451.  comparison  of  the welfare gain with  DC 
shows  to what  extent  the welfare  gains  are  "indirect",  in the 
sense of  resulting  from  adjustment  in the market  to the policy 
change,  and to what  extent they are  simply the direct 
consequence of  the  reduction  in trade costs. 
The  results of  Table  3  show  finally that the ratio of 
welfare  gain  to trade creation is strongly associated with  the 
degree  of  returns  to scale,  exceeding  18%  in the  free  entry 
case  in the  four  industries,  242,  257,  342  and  350,  with  the 
greatest economies  of  scale,  and dropping below  2%  in  footwear, 
where  scale economies  are least.  (The  fact that trade 
liberalisation generates welfare losses  in the  cement  industry 
with  a  fixed  number  of  firms  is a  reflection of  the very high 
transport costs  in this sector,  so  that the gains  to  consumers 
of  increased competition are  more  than wiped out by the losses 
to  firms.) 
The  ratio of welfare  gain to trade created is a  useful 
statistic to  summarise  the results of  the models  because it is 
not directly dependent  on  the precise nature of  the policy 
experiment being modelled  and  can be  used to  compare  our 
results with  those of other studies.  owen  (1983,  pp.144-147 1 
reports welfare gains  of  the order of  50%  of  the value of trade 
creation,  in  a  study of  the effects of  the  EC  that takes 
account  of  economies  of  scale,  in contrast with the  numbers  in 
our Table  3  which  are mostly in the  range  of  8%  to  25%.  There 
seem  to be  three principal sources  of  the difference between 
our  results  and  those  of  owen:  he  assumes  a  much  greater degree 
of  economies  of scale;  he  supposes  that industries  expand 
through  expansion of existing firms  but contract through exit; 
and he  confines  attention to uni-directional  trade creation, 
ignoring intra-industry trade.  our  results  are closer to  those 
generated by  the modelling exercise of Harris  and  Cox  (1984, 
p.114)  who  estimate  in  a  model  with  scale  economies  a  welfare 
gain  of  17.5%  of  trade created by multilateral liberalisation 
of  canadian  trade with  the  rest of  the  world. -15-
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The  preceding section  assumed cournot behaviour  and  a 
fixed  number  of models  per  firm.  While  we  regard this  as  our 
central case,  in this section we  report the effects of 
replacing cournot behaviour by Bertrand,  and  of  removing  the 
assumption that the  number  of  models  is fixed. 
The  difference between  Cournot  and Bertrand behaviour is 
that the latter is more  competitive  in the  sense that each 
firm's  actions  have  less  impact  on  the  industry price indices. 
As  noted  in section 3  this  implies  that the calibrated 
elasticities are  lower  in the Bertrand case  than  in the  cournot 
case,  these being reported in table  4  as  £B  and  £c.  Notice 
that for  industries  in which  the Herfindahl  index is very small 
(for example  322)  the  two  elasticities are similar.  Where  the 
Herfindahl  index  is large  the elasticities may  be  very 
different.  Thus  in  the  cement  industry  (242)  the cournot 
elasticity is 35.5,  and  the Bertrand 8.  It seems  likely that 
Bertrand behaviour overestimates  the  level of  competition  in 
this  industry,  and  consequently attaches  more  weight  to product 
differentiation than  is plausible. 
What  difference  does  Bertrand behaviour make  for  the 
effects of  the  reduction  in trade barriers?  The  policy works 
by  increasing  import penetration,  and  hence  reducing  firms' 
shares  in their domestic  markets,  and  so  increasing 
competitiveness.  With  Bertrand behaviour  these  changes  in 
market  share have  less effect on price  (as price-cost margins 
are  largely accounted  for by product differentiation);  the 
policy therefore  leads  to  smaller price reductions.  The 
smaller magnitude  of price reductions  means  that demand  and 
output  increase by less  than  in the  Cournot  case,  this being 
accentuated by  lower price elasticities.  Smaller output  changes 
lead to  smaller reductions  in  average  costs  (table 4). 
However,  despite  the  smaller  savings  in production cost,  we  see 
that,  when  the  number  of  firms  is fixed,  the welfare  gains  from 
the policy are greater in the Bertrand case  then  in the  cournot 
case.  This  is because  the  increase  in trade  (which  incurs 
transport costs)  is less  in this case. 
A second consequence  of  the  smaller price reduction  in the 
Bertrand case  is that the policy reduces profits by less.  When 
the  number  of  firms  is variable there is therefore less exit 
from  the  industry  (and may  be  entry as  total  industry output 
rises),  so  leading to  smaller reductions  in average  cost.  The 
welfare  gains  are  now  also  smaller,  on  average,  although this 
difference is  ambiguous  due  to  lower  trade costs  and  increased 
product· variety,  with  more  firms  remaining  in  the Bertrand 
case. 
The  second dimension  of sensitivity analysis  explored in 
table  4  is to let the  number  of product varieties produced by 
each  firm  change.  This  experiment  is meaningful  only if there 
is  a  significant degree  of differentiation in  consumer  demand (3) 
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between products varieties,  or there  are significant economies 
of  scope.  Table  4  therefore does  not  report results  for  the 
"models  variable"  case  for  the  four  industries  {242,  260,  438, 
and  451)  where  a  high value of  e  indicates little product 
differentiation,  and our  information on  economies  of  scale 
implies  that there is little cost reduction obtained by 
expanding the  number  of models  produced at given output per 
model.  For  the six industries  in which  this is a  meaningful 
experiment,  table 4  shows  that the  results of  the policy are 
affected in three ways.  First,  changes  in output  are  now 
generally  {but not  invariably)  larger,  due  to  the  fact that 
firms  have  an  additional  instrument with which  to respond to 
the policy change.  second,  the fall  in average costs is now 
generally  {but not  invariably)  smaller.  Firms  shorten their 
production runs  as  they  expand their model  range.  There  are 
economies  of  scope,  but these are smaller than returns  to scale 
in production of  a  particular model.  Third,  the welfare gains 
from  the policy are  now  generally  {but not  invariably)  larger, 
as  the  smaller average  cost reductions  are compensated for by 
the benefits of  increased product variety.  The  welfare 
difference is particularly marked  in two  industries,  electrical 
household appliances  {346)  and motor vehicles  {350);  these both 
being  industries in which  economies  of  scope  are  assumed  to be 
relatively significant. 
overall,  we  regard the variation in results across 
different variants  of  the model  as  surprisingly small.  From 
the  theoretical literature we  know  that it is possible to 
construct examples  where  assumptions  on  market  structure 
reverse  the effects of policy.  A  sign change  of this type is 
observed in the  cement  industry  {242),  but this is readily 
explicable  in  terms  of  the high transport costs  in this 
industry.  Apart  from  this,  not only the sign,  but also the 
order of magnitude  of the welfare  gains,  and  the ranking of 
industries by welfare  gain  are fairly stable across  industries. 
We  have  not  undertaken  formal  sensitivity analysis with 
respect to parameters  of  the model  such  as  the  returns  to scale 
parameters  or the overall product  demand  elasticity.  In the 
former  case,  the  comparison of  results  for different industries 
gives  a  fairly clear indication of how  changes  in assumptions 
about  scale economies  would affect the  conclusions  {see the 
discussion of Table  3  in the previous  section).  In the latter 
case,  it is evident  from  the  formal  structure of  the model  that 
variations  in this elasticity within plausible ranges  are most 
unlikely to have  significant or systematic effects on  the 
results of  the model,  being  swamped  by  the efffects of 
differences  in the  model  elasticity. -17-
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Table  5  reports  the results  for  the  ten industries of  a 
much  more  dramatic  interpretation of what  is  involved in 
"completing the  internal market".  It is  assumed that trade 
costs  are  reduced as  in the previous  case,  but also that  firms 
treat the whole  EC  as  a  single integrated market  and have  no 
ability to price discriminate between different  "national" 
markets. 
The  key  to understanding the effect of this  change  in the 
market  is to recall  the  role that market  share plays  in giving 
firms  market  power,  especially in the  Cournot version of the 
model.  When  different countries  are treated by  firms  as being 
different markets,  then  the  large  share that  firms  typically 
have  in their own  domestic markets  gives  them  the ability to 
charge higher prices  to  home  consumers.  With  EC  market 
integration,  shares  in  "national"  markets  are no  longer of 
economic  significance,  and all firms  have quite small  shares of 
the whole  EC  market,  even  in the more  concentrated industries. 
Thus  the  change  being modelled here  is much  more  strongly pro-
competitive  than  the earlier policy experiment. 
The  results of  the  change  are  reported industry-by-
industry in Table  5  and  are  summarised  and  compared with  the 
previous,  "segmented market",  case  in Table  6. 
In several  industries,  the shift to  integrated markets 
leads  to  a  reduction  in  intra-EC trade,  reported in the  fourth 
row  of  each part in Table  6.  This  is the natural  consequence of 
the  reduction  in  firms'  market  power  ~n their home  markets 
leading  to  a  reduction  in their prices  in those markets.  More 
important,  in most  industries there are much  more  substantial 
loss  of profits  and  in all industries much  greater gains of 
consumer  surplus  in this  experiment  than  in the  experiment 
reported in Table  2.  When  in Table  6  we  compare  the  two  sets of 
cournot  experiments  we  find that in the more  concentrated 
industries where  firms  had significant market  power  (242,  257, 
260,  330,  346,  350)  the  increase  in the competitivity of  the 
market  as  a  result of  integration leads  to welfare  gains quite 
significantly larger than  those  in the  segmented market  case: 
the  impact  on  economic  welfare  in these  industries of  the 
reduction  in trade costs  .. c.QJllbi.ne.d  with the shift to  integrated 
markets  is typically  (with  fixed  numbers  of  firms)  .. L~_t~ 
the  size of  the welfare gain  from  the reduction in trade costs 
alone  and  in most  of  these  industries  the welfare gain is in 
the  region of  1%-4%  of base  consumption. 
The  consequence  of  the profit change  is that if entry and 
exit are permitted there  is greater exit in most  industries  in 
the  integrated market  experiment,  and  again this  implies  that 
the welfare  gains  are  much  larger than  in the free  entry case 
when  markets  are  segmented.  The  welfare gains  are not 
invariably larger with  free  entry than  they were with fixed 
numbers  of  firms,  and  most  of  the gains  for  concentrated -18-
industries  are still in the  range  of  1%  to  4%  of base 
consumption but the  gain rises to  12%  in the  motor  industry 
when  exit is permitted. 
In  the  segmented market  policy experiment,  we  reported 
welfare  change  as  a  fraction of  intra-EC trade creation,  but 
this is not  now  a  meaningful  statistic since  a  reduction  in 
intra-EC trade  can be  the result of  the policy change. 
Table  6  also  shows  that maiket  integration has little 
effect in those  industries where  concentration is  low  (machine 
tools  and  footwear)  and has little effect in the Bertrand 
version of  the model.  This  simply reflects the fact  that market 
shares  give little market  power  in these cases,  so  that  a 
change  in market  structure which  changes  effective market 
shares  has little real effect  . 
.. C.an.c.lus.ians 
It is appropriate to precede  our  conclusions with  a  note 
about  the  limitations of  the kind of  exercise that we  have 
undertaken here.  We  believe that the  facts  of industrial 
concentration,  economies  of  scale,  and  intra-industry trade 
provide  a  strong case  for  modelling many  markets  as  being 
imperfectly competitive;  and only  a  modelling exercise based, 
as  this one  has been,  on  imperfect  competition can  hope  to 
capture  in  a  consistent  fashion  many  key effects of policy 
changes  in such markets.  It will be clear  from  the earlier 
sections of  the paper that we  have  more  confidence  in the 
"Cournot"  versions  of our model,  since it seems  to give  an 
appropriate weight  to market  shares  in describing equilibrium. 
Even  this model,  however,  is at best  a  crude  approximation to 
the  complexity of  imperfectly competitive behaviour  in the real 
world. 
All  of  the results reported above  are of  a  partial 
equilibrium nature  in that the analysis  is conducted on  an 
industry-by-industry basis.  There  are  three possible  important 
effects which  are left out of  such  an  approach.  one  is the 
effect of price changes  of  intermediate  goods  used  as  inputs  in 
other industries;  the  second relates to  changes  in the prices 
of primary factors  of production  as  different sectors  compete 
for  these  factors;  and  the third is the possible effect of 
exchange  rate changes  resulting from  the projected changes  in 
trade patterns.  we  have  not modelled  such  interactions,  and 
our  judgement  is that including the latter two  effects is 
unlikely to have  a  major  impact  on  our results:  there might  be 
important  changes  in exchange  rates  and  in factor prices,  but 
the  feedback  effects  into the  goods  markets  are likely to be  of 
second-order  importance.  The  possible effects of  intermediate 
goods  price changes  are harder to  guess  without  actually 
developing  a  formal  model  that distinguishes between 
intermediate  and  final  goods,  and  models  the  appropriate 
general  equilibrium interactions.  It is possible that the - 19-
omission of  such  interactions  leads  to  a  significant 
.underes.timate of  the effects of policy change. 
What  degree of  confidence  then should one  have  in our 
results?  Different versions of  the mod'l  produce  fairly 
similar projections  for the  EC  A£_g_whole  and this is 
encouraging.  There  is some  reason  to have  greater confidence 
in our results  for  the  EC  as  a  whole  than  in our allocation of 
these results .a&J:.Q.S..S.  __ .,C_Q.un.t.r..i..e.s.  For  example,  in the  free  entry 
case  we  see that increased competition causes exit of  firms  in 
the  EC  as  a  whole,  and  the consequent  changes  in firm  scale  and 
average  costs  are very similar for  firms  in all countries. 
Which  countries  does  the exit occur  in?  The  results derived by 
the model  come  essentially from  projection of existing patterns 
of  trade,  with  the positions of net exporters being 
strengthened.  However,  if the actual effect of the  reduction 
in intra-EC barriers was  different  from  the equiproportionate 
reduction  in tariff equivalents that we  have  modelled,  the 
distribution between countries of  the  changes  in output would 
be different,  and it should be  recalled that we  have  no 
information on  the extent to which  the  apparent bar.riers 
represented by the tariff equivalents are the result of genuine 
differences  in tastes  as  opposed to potentially removable 
artificial barriers. 
In interpreting the results,  one  also needs  to recall that 
they have  been produced by assuming  a  reduction of  2.5%  in 
intra-EC trade costs.  If one  believed that the  scope  for 
actual  cost reductions  were  different  from  this,  the projected 
effects  on  welfare  and costs  should be  adjusted accordingly. 
Also  we  have  reported above  the  figure  for  the welfare gain  as 
a  fraction of trade created,  because this figure  may  remain  a 
reasonable estimate even if trade is created by methods  other 
than the  reduction in tariff-equivalent barriers which  we  have 
modelled. 
we  have  examined  two  interpretations of what  is involved 
in  "completing the  internal market  in the  EC".  The  first 
treated the policy as  a  quantitative change,  involving small 
reductions  in barriers to trade.  This  change  resulted in 
increased import penetration in each  country,  so  increasing 
competition,  and raising welfare,  by modest  though  significant 
amounts.  our projections  could be  rescaled to provide 
approximate  estimates of  the effects of barrier reductions  of  a 
different size  from  the one  we  have  modelled. 
The  second policy change  involved  a  qualitative change  in 
firms'  behaviour:  forcing  firms  to act on  a  European-wide 
"integrated market"  basis,  so  removing  firms'  ability to 
exploit their domestic  market  power.  This policy yields  large 
welfare  gains.  It also causes  large reductions  in profit  (and 
in the  long  run  in the  number  of  firms),  and it is not clear to 
what  extent there exist feasible  changes  in  EC  trade policy and 
competition policy that could actually being about  such  a 
change. -20-
The  gains  from  "completing the  internal market"  differ 
substantially therefore  according to whether  the phrase. means 
simply moving  the  EC  closer to being  a  true  common  market,  or 
whether it is to be  interpreted as  the creation of  a  genuinely 
unified market  on  a  scale greater that the u.s.A.  The  policy 
implication of our results is that  a  ma]or  aim  of  EC 
competition policy should be  to  remove  the  sources  of price 
differences between different national markets within the  EC. 
successful policy of this nature would have  more  effect on 
economic welfare  in the  long  run  that policies  aimed only at 
barriers more  directly and obviously affecting international 
trade. -21-
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Table  1;  Ca~ibratioQ 
2U2  gement,  l.ime  and  plaster 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mJ!:CU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  1860.32  33.12  7-ll5  1.97  1ll.50  11ll.5ll 
G  ll. 35  1932.2ll  0.89  3-19  79-38  68.75 
It  1.57  0.32  2138.09  0.02  o.llJ  111.17 
UK  1.20  0.37  0.16  1212.33  ll. 20  26.111 
RoEC  lll.52  29.50  2.1l1  12.59  7369.62  302.66 
RoW  0.28  12.73  7.111  1.117  ll.76  1208.68 
Number  of  firms= 
13  17  19  10  60  10 
Number  of sub-industries•  1. 
Returns  to scale. 
~ increase in average  cost at 1/3 output  per model:  20% 
~ increase  in  average  cost  at 1/2  number  of models;  o~ 
Linear/loslinear  wei~hts;  0.5,  0.5: 
Elastic!  tv  - 0.6 
Tariff equivalents; 
F  G 
F  0.00  0.19 
G  0.27  0.00 
It  0.29  0.30 
UK  0.28  0.28 
RoEC  0.27  0.23 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - -6.8  -6.8 
Bertrand Calibration 
l!:lasticit~  - 8.01. 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - -6.8  -6.9 
.It 
0.22 
0.27 
o.oo 
0.29 
0.28 
-6.8 
-6.8 
UK 
0.32 
0.31 
o.ll1 
0.00 
0.31 
-6.6 
-6.8 
Ro!:C 
0.15 
0.11 
0.2ll 
0.17 
o.oo 
-7.1 
-6.9 -23-
_g_2_Z  ____ f.harmaceu t !cal  P~o-~  u  c_.!.~ 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
P'r  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fi-.  5275-79  16l1.31  52.71  71.03  167.37  821.89 
G  59.10  il91ll.07  1l10.17  110.ll8  266.93  1138.ll5 
It  ll5.52  67.50  ll015.36  20.llll  45.82  487.57 
UK  8ll.29  87.27  92.6ll  3399.65  267.02  1119.32 
RoEC  117.ll7  23ll.8o  71.16  138.07  2016.25  784.1J9 
RoW  237.99  409.20  21!3.47  206.25  IJ26.09  18558.51 
Number  or  firms= 
135  71  88  ll6  50  298 
Number  of sub-industries=  5. 
Returns  to  scale. 
% increase  in  average  cost at  1/2 output  per model;  22% 
% increase  in  average  cost  at 1/2  number  ot models;  5% 
Linear/loclinear weights:  1.0,  o.o; 
Elasticitv  =  0.8 
Cournot  CalibrationL 
Elastic!  tv  =  5.8 
Tariff equivalents: 
F  G 
F  o.oo  0.53 
G  0.61  0.00 
It  0.61  0.58 
UK  0.55  0.56 
RoEC  o.l19  o.ll2 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - -0.6  -0.6 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elastic!  tv 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
It 
0.61! 
0.55 
o.oo 
0.56 
0.56 
-0.6 
w  - 17.9  17.9  17.9 
UK  RoEC 
0.62  0.51 
0.59  o.ll6 
0.69  0.60 
o.oo  o.ll2 
0.50  o.oo 
-0.6  -0.6 
17.9  17.9 -24-
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  288.66  81.53  79.05  27.38  80.23  152.95 
G  177.92  432.34  175.12  153-30  323.55  6la9.07 
It  100.28  83.25  779.21  67.17  119.26  307.33 
UK  6.98  26.63  19.la2  822.01  63.62  8la.73 
RoEC  106.117  186.113  79.117  121.18  612.118  127.15 
RoW  90.57  1110.18  110.96  172.77  172.38  15211.21 
Number  of  firms= 
5  13  10  7  8  15 
Number  of sub-industries=  1. 
Returns  to scale. 
" 
increase in  avere.sre  cost at 1/2 output  per model;  10" 
" 
increase  in  ave~:-age cost at 1/2  number  ot'  models;  3" 
Linear/loclinear weights;  o. 5.  0.5: 
Elasticitv  - 0.5. 
Co~rnot Calibration; 
Elasticity  =  21.511. 
Tariff equivalents: 
P'  G  It  UK  RoEC 
P'  o.oo  0.06  0.16  0.28  0.111 
G  0.17  0.00  0.17  0.211  0.11 
It  0.19  0.10  o.oo  0.27  0.16 
UK  0.29  0.111  0.2ll  o.oo  0.17 
RoEC  0.17  0.03  0.19  0.23  o.oo 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - -2.0  -2.1  -2.0  -1.9  -2.0 
Bertrand Calibration 
l!:lasticitv  - 8.71. 
Model  Conjectures  ("), 
w  - 25.9  30.0  25.9  25.9  25.9 
(4) -25-
.J.g  __ ?  __ .Ma9hine  _Tools. 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  580.27  88.60  35.87  33-77  57.5&  l95.95 
G  330.86  21156.86  1611.38  2111.00  350.09  2519.82 
It  135.111  123.93  1171.60  &6.37  52.12  635.68 
UK  119.86  62.82  2ll.51  758.&0  88.77  713.3ll 
RoEC  70.71  132.02  19.81  53.02  621.86  298.21 
RoW  298.ll2  653.72  18li.Ola  358.78  270.71l.  8899.08 
Number  of  firms= 
79  20ll  115  186  62  556 
Number  of  sub-industries=  1. 
Returns  to  scale. 
% increase  in  average  cost at 1/2 output  per model;  7~ 
% increase  in  average  cost  at  1/2  number  o~ models;  1~ 
Linear/loglinear weights:  0.8.  0.2: 
Elasticity  = 1.1 
Elasticity  - 13.55-
Tarif'f'  equivalents; 
F  G  It  UK  RoEC 
F  0.00  o. 13  0.21  0.20  0.18 
G  0.15  0.00  0.21  0.18  0.16 
It  0.1&  0.1ll  o.oo  0.21  0.21 
UK  0.19  0.17  0.25  o.oo  0.16 
RoEC  0.15  0.09  0.2la  0.16  0.00 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Beptrand  Calibration 
Elasticitv  - 13.25 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - 1&.3  1&.3  1&.3  1A.2 -26-
3JO  Office Machinerv. 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  36112.39  392.97  1111.28  227.18  2112.39  6116.68 
G  682.03  3022.19  293-57  1136.08  1133.08  1203.211 
It  293.86  208.78  2ll73.85  168.27  151l.96  ll69.18 
UK  387.60  372.85  1911.51  1ll31.ll1  381.00  990.72 
RoEC  317.21l  ll36.91  111.30  551.71  2889.95  665.711 
RoW  11l31l.56  1659.211  551.99  1828.86  131l8.03  17123.55 
Number  of  firms= 
9  17  6  20  111  10 
Number  of sub-industries•  2. 
Returns  to scale. 
~ increase  in  averace cost at 1/2 output  per model:  10~ 
% increase  in  averace  cost at 1/2  number  of models:  5~ 
Linear/loclinear weichts:  0.8,  0.2: 
Elasticitv  - 0.90. 
Cou~not Calibration; 
Elastlcit~  - 32.77. 
Tariff equivalents;  ..  G  ..  o.oo  0.10 
G  0.16  o.oo 
It  0.16  0.11 
UK  0.16  0.10 
RoEC  0.18  0.10 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
It 
0.30 
0.28 
o.oo 
0.28 
0.30 
w  •  -2.ll  -2.5  -2.1l 
Bertrand Calibration 
IElaeticitv  •  10.90 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
w  •  ao.a  ao.3  ao.a 
UK  RoEC 
0.10  0.10 
0.08  0.12 
0.10  0.11l 
o.oo  0.11 
0.01  o.oo 
-2.5  -2.5 
ll0.2 -27-
.J_f!_g__.~lectric  motors,  senera~_Q..!:.!L__!!tC. 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
P'r  7106.81  218.95  110.10  90.06  171l.80  1361.29 
G  1!119. 10  151128.51  2117.86  2311.17  553-78  251l0.08 
It  117.51  92.39  2170.80  37.78  51.95  789.58 
UK  80.25  96.90  38.02  2219.60  165.111  1516.68 
RoEC  105.06  190.88  115.59  88.66  3559.12  5118.73 
RoW  3111.112  79ll.oll  201.08  519.70  ll05.86  28778.00 
Number  of  firms= 
65  186  ll6  121  53  362 
Number  of sub-industries•  3. 
Returns  to scale. 
% increase in  averace cost at 1/2 output  per model:  15% 
% increase  in  average  cost at  1/2  number  of models:  5~ 
Linear/loclinear weichts;  0.8,  0.21 
Elasticitv  - 1.1 
Cournot  Calibration; 
ltlasticitv  - 7-35 
Tariff equivalents: 
F  G  It  UK  RoEC 
F  o.oo  0.112  0.119  o.ll8  0.116 
G  0.1111  0.00  0.118  o.ll6  0.112 
It  0.39  o.ao  o.oo  0.46  0.117 
TJK  o.11a  o.ll1  o.so  0.00  0.38 
Roi!:C  0.43  0.36  0.50  o.a1  o.oo 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
w  - 3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elasticitv 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
w  - 27.5  27..1l  27.3  27.3 -28-
.3_/J 6_  Domestic  Electrical  A~pliances  . 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
P'r  2660.211  93.211  67.19  92.58  911.27  226.09 
G  286.711  21191.38  93.112  139-31l  372.72  5911.19 
It  260.22  2111.111  1539.39  253.11l  186.59  l29.62 
UK  2l.03  23. 3.8  8.72  1l05.86  77.00  126.91 
RoEC  77.06  1\1.6l  8.16  85.6ll  1635.118  215.76 
RoW  187.55  192.ll9  111.26  200.89  175-59  3290.17 
Number  ot tirms• 
22  311  27  36  22 
Number  ot sub-industries•  5. 
Returns  to  scale. 
% increase  in  average  cost at 1/2 output  per model;  10~ 
%  increase  in  average  cost  at 1/2  number  ot models;  5% 
Linear/loclinear  wei~hts:  0.5,  0.5: 
Elasticitv  •  1.75-
Cournot  Calibration; 
Elasticitv  - 10.77. 
Taritt equivalents: 
F  G  It  UK  RoEC 
F  o.oo  0.31  0.3ll  0.3ll  0.311 
G  0.27  o.oo  0.33  0.33  0.24 
It  0.25  0.23  o.oo  0.25  0.27 
UK  0.36  0.33  0.110  0.00  0.28 
RoEC  0.32  0.25  o.llll  0.31  o.oo 
Model  Conjectures  (%). 
w  - 6.5  6.3  6.11  6.3  6.l 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elastic!  tv  •  7-78. 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
w  - 62.6  62.0  62.1 -29-
438  Carpets,  linoleum etc. 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
P'r  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  1!11.79  27.71  13.91  13.29  25.28  65.02 
G  72.31  591.81  3lt.60  3lt.27  131.85  237.66 
It  ll5.13  32.70  151.78  18.95  17.32  8l.32 
UK  19.69  32.58  6.15  969.97  52.50  130.80 
RoEC  232.12  382.06  37.02  213.31  3201.l7  392.93 
RoW  88.15  536.1l1  65.52  123.87  102.06 l7l1.82 
Number  or firma• 
25  30  15  52  165  210 
Number  ot sub-industries• 1. 
Returns  to scale. 
~ increase  in averace  coat at 1/2 output  per model:  6" 
"  increase  in .ave  race cost at 1/2 number ot modelaa  3" 
Linear/loclinear weishts:  o. '· 0.5; 
l!:lasticitv  •  0.95. 
Cournot  Calibration; 
Elaaticit~  •  21.1l 
Taritt equivalents: 
F  G  It  UK  RoEC  ..  o.oo  0.11  0.16  0.17  0.13 
G  0.13  o.oo  0.15  0.16  0.09 
It  0.09  0.08  o.oo  0.13  0.12 
UK  0.18  0.13  0.22  o.oo  0.13 
RoEC  0.32  0.25  o.llll  0.31  o.oo 
Model  Conjectures  ("), 
w  - 1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elaaticitv  - 17.59 
Model  Con~ecturea (")· 
w  - 36.6  36.6  36.5  36.6 -30-
320  Motor  Vehicles 
Production/Consumption matrix.  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  22702.28  1342.23  1644.29  858.53  1397-31  aa3a.67 
G  3136.92  23571.78  1988.86  2877.10  1&932.93  15737.12 
It  1028.58  625.97  8873.110  311.21  333.78  2057-77 
UK  1178.23  639.63  305.56  10053.23  817.55  3"86.90 
RoEC  1223.58  2108.70  615.11  1533.90  11507.32  1237.59 
RoW  1908.76  1696.23  887.25  1855.119  2618.98  350311.30 
Number  of  t'irms• 
2  5  2  3  2  " 
Number  ot'  sub-industries• 1. 
Returns  to scale. 
~ increase  in average cost at 1/2 output  per modela  16~ 
~ increase  in  averaee cost at 1/2  number. ot'  models;  8~ 
Linear/loclinear weights;  0.5.  0.5; 
Elasticitv  - 1.63 
Cournot  Calibration: 
Elasticitv  - 13.32. 
Ta.rit'f'  e']uivalents; 
F  G  It  UK  RoEC 
p  o.oo  0.2.  0.32  0.32  0.31 
G  0.3ll  o.oo  0.35  0.27  0.25 
It  0.30  0.21  o.oo  0.31  0.32 
UK  0.36  0.22  0.37  o.oo  0.28 
RoEC  0.32  0.15  0.35  0.23  o.oo 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
w  - -5.1  -4.6  -1&.8  -a.6  -ll.8 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elasticitv 
Model  Conjectures  (~). 
w  - 33.0  35.0  33.0  35.0  35.0 ---·--
-31-
Table 2; Redttction in Trade Barrier• 
Segtnented Market• 
242 Cement, Hme aad plaster: (Coarnot; mode-ls pe-r  firm t'onstant) 
Production and welfare t'hanse by coanhy  ----------- ------Fixed  -~;~·;,r-a;m.--··--- -· ·-------....  ···-----
Variable no. of ftrms 
6  output  6  COftiUJileU'  6  profit  6  output  6  connmeu'  6  number 
%  nrplus, mBOU  mBOU  %  nrplu, mBOU  of&rn. 
France  1.75  12.2  -15.4  2.33  24.0  -1 
Germany  -1.01  10.4  -15.2  18.6  51.7  -4 
l&aly  -0.99  1.7  -3.7  -0.81  9.8  -1 
U.K.  -4.0  9.5  -17.4  -2.16  17.9  -1 
RofEC  -1.10  10.2  -7.6  -3.66  -8.8  1 
EC  0.24  43.9  -59.3  0.58  94.5  -7 
EC  r  ates 
6  intra-EC  6  extra-EO  6  extra-EC  6  price%  6  averace  6  welfare% 
trade%  exports%  import•%  (EC ave)  cost•%  consumption 
Fixed no.  of firms  128.5  0.4  -10.7  -0.42  -0.03  -o:1 
Variable no.  of firms  180.6  0.0  -33.6  -0.93  -0.93  0.64 
25'1  Pltarmaceutical producttt (Coarnot; models per ftrm constant) 
Produdion and welfare chanse b1 country 
Fixed no.  of firnu  Variable no. of firnu 
6  welfan% 
6  int-EC trade 
-5.0 
22.1 
6  output  A  consumer~' 
IUrplus,  mBCU 
6  proftt 
mBOU 
6  output  A consum;;;-,  -K"nmb~r 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
R ofEC 
EC 
% 
0.46 
0.42 
-0.22 
0.52 
0.68 
0.37 
6  intra-EC 
trade% 
Fixed no.  of ftrms  13.3 
Variable no. of ftrms  13.3 
12.3 
19.5 
16.2 
18.3 
20.8 
87.2 
6  extra-EC 
exports% 
0.0 
-0.3 
1.40 
-3:4 
-8.2 
-6.3 
-2.7 
-19.1 
% 
0.60 
0.44 
-0.42 
0.30 
0.42 
0.30 
EC aggregates 
6  extra-EC  6  price% 
imports%  EC ave) 
-2.0  -0.16 
-1.6  -0.15  ----- -----------------
1Urplus, mBOU  of ftrnu 
14.4  0 
16.8  0 
7.9  -1 
13.2  0 
17.8  0 
70.0  -1 
6  avera1e  6  welfare%  6  welfare" 
costs%  consumption  4  lnt-BC b ..  ., 
-0.08  0.29  21.8 
-0.15  0.30  22.5  ------· -32-
!2.!_  Footwear 
Production/Consumption matrix,  1982  mECU. 
Fr  G  It  UK  RoEC  RoW 
Fr  196ll.10  107.87  21.51  ll2.53  102.85  260.93 
G  ll2.76  1238.02  10.22  15.25  126.07  239.68 
It  535.0ll  861l.89  126ll..111  358.25  1111.6. 59  11189.36 
UK  10.62  11.01  7.25  11311.15  83.63  91l.81l 
RoEC  20.00  87.31  2.l1  30.77  689.88  103.60 
RoW  291.117  581.110  78.56  350.28  2l6.99  l298.87 
Number  of  firms= 
9ll  71  65  l2  388 
Number  ot sub-industries• 1. 
Returns  to scale. 
% increase  in  average  cost at 1/2 output  per model:  2% 
~ increase  in  average  cost  at 1/2  number  or models:  2% 
Linear/loKlinear  wei~hts:  0.5,  0.5: 
Elastic!  t~·  =  0.70. 
Cournot  Calibr~~~~nL 
Elasticit~  =  53.29 
Tarirf' equivalents: 
F  G  It  UK  RoEC 
F  o.oo  0.06  0.08  0.08  o.o6 
G  0.07  0.00  0.08  0.09  0.05 
It  0.03  0.02  o.oo  0.05  o.oa 
UK  0.09  0.09  0.08  o.oo  0.05 
RoEC  0.07  o.oll  0.09  0.07  o.oo 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - 1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
Bertrand Calibration 
Elaaticit~ 
Model  Conjectures  (%), 
w  - 99-3  99.3  99-3  99-3 -33-
Segtnented Markets 
330 OfRce Machinery: (Cournot; mod~lt~ p~r firm ('Onlltant) 
Prod  udion and welfare change by country  ----·-- - v;,i;bie ao. o( fira.  Fixed no.  of lira. 
A output.  A contumers'  A pro&&  A oa&pa&  A COIIMitnen'  6  •mher 
%  nrplus, aaBCU  aaBCU  %  nrplas, .acu  of&ra. 
fr&il~  3.31  112.4  -63.4  -21.3  91.4  -3 
GermaaJ  13.4  60.0  10.9  33.6  64.8  3 
ltaiJ  4.37  148.9  -113.1  -26.0  129.0  -2 
U.K.  -21.3  37.3  14.4  78.9  60.9  11 
R. of EC  8.24  68.7  -17.3  -11.6  49.7  -3 
EC  10.4  407.4  -168.4  12.6  396.0  6 
EC aggre  ates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A ext.ra-EC  A price%  A aYetace  A welfare%  6  weller•% 
trade%  exports%  import..%  (EC an)  -=-&•%  consump&loa  A la&-EC trade 
- F;;·;cr;;:-.;ri~-- ·---44:6----s:s;----25:9-----1:&7-'-----o.98 ___  o:·as----8.o--
v.riabte no.  of firms  67".2  12.3  -27.6  -2.48  -2.48  1.46  10.7 
342 Blectric motors, 1eneratora, etc: (Coarno&; models per firm constant) 
Produdion and welfare change by country 
Fixed llo.  of firms  Variable no.  of firms  ---------·-·--- -~  ---·-··---·----- A output.  A contumers'  A profit.  A ou&pa&  A conswners'  A number 
%  surplus, mBCU  ntBCU  %  s,.q»lus, aaBCU  offirllll 
France  0.09  26.6  -7.0  -0.02  19.9  0 
GermanJ  1.01  22.6  17.3  1.49  46.8  2 
J&aiJ  -0.56  19.3  -7.7  -1.98  10.1  -1 
tr.K.  -0.06  15.7  -1.5  0.04  14.4  0 
RofEC  -0.86  30.0  -11.3  -2.26  14.8  -2 
EC  0.37  114.2  -10.2  0.31  106.1  -2 
.. ------·------- ----
EC agregates 
A int.ra-EC  A ex&ra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A ••era1e  A welfare%  A wellue% 
trade%  exports%  imports%  (EC ave)  COlts"  COIIIUIIIp&loa  6  ln&-BC trade 
Fixed no.  of ftrms  17.3  0.1  -2.3  -0.08  -0.06  0.29  19.1 
Variable no.  of ftrms  17.9  -0.2  -1.9  -0.09  -0.09  0.29  11.4  ------34-
Segmented Markets 
280; A.rtifteial and Synthetie fibres: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country  ... 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of ftrms 
A output  A consumers'  A profit  A output  A COR1111ftetS'  A number 
%  surplus, mBCU  mBCU  %  surplus, mBCU  of ftrms 
France  2.37  18.7  -6.8  -66.3  16.1  -3 
GermaaJ  14.6  8.0  11.4  87.9  16.9  10 
ltaiJ  1.77  22.7  -14.2  -13.6  21.1  -3 
U.K.  -6.71  36.7  -30.7  -21.4  31.9  -2 
RofEC  -0.14  20.8  -8.90  -41.7  20.0  -4 
EC  4.19  106.9  -49.2  6.61  106.0  -3 
EC ag regales 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A anrace  A welfare%  A welfare% 
trade %  exports%  lntports%  (EC ave)  costs%  consumption  A int-EC trade 
Fix~;r~;,-;1  fir~----- ---20 . .------= ·2:o------=24j----=r.29....:,_  ____  o.s·-~ ---o.  ti·----i3.o----·-· 
Variable no.  of firms  36.9  10.6  -23.2  -2.45  ·2.45  1.84  14.0 
322 Maeltine Tools: (Cournot; models per lhm constant) 
Production and welfare ehange by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of firnu 
·-~-o-u-tp_u_t  ___  A_c_o;.s~~~-s'--Ap;-oft-t-t--A-ou_t_p--u-t  --A·-;~;;;...e;T  A number 
%  surplus, mBCU  mBCU  %  surplus, mBOU  of ftrms 
France  -0.58  16.8  -0.9  -18.4  11.9  -15 
GermanJ  4.1  11.3  13.5  18.6  36.4  38 
Italy  -0.02  12.2  ·1.0  -4.49  9.7  -6 
U.K.  -0.18  13.1  -0.5  -6.47  11.0  -13 
R of EC  -2.30  17.8  -2.3  -29.6  8.9  -19 
EC  1.67  71.2  8.8  2.66  78.8  ·16  ____  __,._ ___________________  ~---------
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A averace  A welfare,;,  A welfare% 
trade%  exports%  imports%  (EC ave)  costs%  couumption  b. lnt-EC trade 
Fixed no.  of ftmu  27.1  0.3  -8.5  -0.05  -0.12  0.84  13.8 
Variable no.  of ftrms  32.0  2.7  -9.4  -0.05  -0.05  0.82  11.4 -35-
SeganP.ntcd Markets 
438 Carpets, linoleum etc.: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country  ------ ····------- ---------· 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of ftrm1 
A output  A c0111umers'  A profit  A output  A connmeis'  A number 
%  surplus, mBCU  mBCU  %  nrplus, .acu  olfirm1 
France  -21.2  13.7  -5.8  -52.4  6.4  -15 
GennanJ  11.6  14.6  0.8  32.4  19.2  6 
ltaiJ  -0.37  6.2  -1.8  -21.3  4.8  -5 
U.K.  -12.0  11.1  -5.6  -18.8  6.3  -15 
RofEC  7.66  16.2  2.7  10.6  22.0  11 
EC  2.51  62.0  -9.8  2.70  58.8  -18 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A anra1e  A welfare%  A welfare% 
trade%  exporll%  Imports%  (EC ave)  coste%  consu~ptlon  A lnt-EC trade 
Fixed no:-;, firms  45.0  1.8  -16.7  -0.30  -0.17  0.67  8.0 
Variable no.  of lir1111  53.7  2.3  -17.2  -0.49  -0.49  0.76  7.5 
451 Footwear: (Coarnot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of firms  ------
A output  A consumers'  A profit  A output  A consamers'  A number 
%  surplus, mBCU  mBCU  %  surplus, mBCU  ol Arms 
France  -0.32  11.5  -4.4  -24.1  8.6  -31 
GermanJ  -5.46  12.2  -3.3  -62.7  8.0  -47 
ItAly  15.9  4.2  4.6  72.0  13.7  311 
U.K.  -15.0  10.6  -6.4  -57.2  5·.2  -41 
RofEC  -12.7  13.3  -4.6  -80.3  7.2  -35 
EC  3.21  .51.8  -14.0  3.44  42.8  157 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A ex&ra-EC  A price%  6. averace  6.  welfare%  6.  welfutt% 
trade%  exports%  bnports%  (EC ave)  costa%  consumption  A int-EC trade 
Fixed no. or firma  41.4  3.8  -21.3  -0.15  -0.03  0.35  3.1 
Variable no. ol finnl  92.7  17.9  -14.7  -0.03  -0.03  0.40  ••• -36-
Seg1nented Markets 
340 Elec:tric:al household appliances: (Cournot; models per finn eonstant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
·-- --·  --·-·· - --·-·---·-·- ··-·  ·-·- .... ·-- - -- . ··---·----··-- -- ·--·-------·-··----·-------------
Fixed no.  o{ firms  Variable no.  o{ firms 
A output  A consumers'  A profit  A output  A consumers'  A number 
%  surplus, mBOU  ntBOU  %  surplus, mBOU  offtrms 
France  0.76  33.2  -16.9  -0.44  26.1  -1 
Germany  4.32  24.4  -0.4  6.33  28.0  0 
Italy  6.40  18.6  0.6  8.89  21.8  0 
U.K.  -4.93  20.3  -11.2  -8.14  10.6  -5 
RofEC  -0.59  29.2  -13.6  -3.63  20.0  -2 
EC  2.09  126.8  -41.6  2.08  105.5  -8 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A averase  A  welfare%  A  welfare% 
trade %  exports %  imports %  (EC ave)  costs%  consumption  A  int-EC trade 
Fixed·~-~:-o"ffi~;;-----22:1----- i~·~-------·7~6  -0.62  -0.32---0.64  ·---1·i.8  ___  . 
VtuiKblc no.  o{ firms  I  24.7  0.6  -6.8  -0.93  -0.93  0.81  16.7 
360 Moto~ Yelticletl (Cournot; model• per flrm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of firms  ·--------------------.. ----. --------·r-----·-·--------------·-
A output  A consumers'  A profit  A output  A consumers'  A number 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
RofEC 
EC 
%  surplus, mBOU  mBOU  %  surplus, mBOU  of firms 
2.26  624.9  -316.3  1.36  482.3  0 
6.79  224.5  61.0  10.7  309.4  0 
1.26  307.4  -174.7  -3.10  257.1  0 
-0.46  234.1  -123.3  -4.76  185.0  0 
2.72  337.7  -125.6  -1.85  297.7  0 
3.36  1628.6  -678.0  3.64  1531.6  -1 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A edra-EC  A price%  A averase  A welfare% 
trade%  exporb%  bnports%  (EC ave)  costs%  conswnption 
Fixed no.  of firms  18.7  1.2  -13.2  -1.07  -0.66  0.83 
Variable no.  of firms  21.2  1.4  -11.7  -1.51  -1.51  1.34 
A  welfare% 
A int-EC trade 
17.9 
25.5 -37-
Tnhlc 3:  Reduction in Trade Barriers 
All Industries (Cournot, models per finn constant) 
A output  A avera1e  A welfare%  A welfare% 
%  cost%,  consumption  A lnt-EC trade 
242; Cetnent, lhne and plaster: 
t=35.5, RS=20%, TS=l.6%, 8=0.066, DC=0.04% 
Fixed no.  of firms  I 0.24  -0.03  -0.1  -6.0 
Variable no.  of firms  0.58  -0.93  0.64  22.1 
257; Pltarmaceutical products: 
f=6.8, RS=22%, TS=  10.0%, 8=0.060, DC=0.26% 
Fixed no.  of firms  I 0.37  -0.08  0.29  21.8 
Variable no.  of firms  0.30  -0.16  0.30  22.6 
260; Artificial and synthetic fibres: 
t=21.6, RS=IO%, TS=36.4%, 8=0.050, DC=0.91% 
Fixed no. of firms  I 4.19  -0.61  0.99  13.0 
Variable no.  of firms  6.61  -2.45  1.84  14.0 
322; Machine tools: 
£= 13.6, RS=7%, TS=22.4%, H=0.004, DC=0.56% 
Fixed no.  of firms  I  1.67  -0.12  0.84  13.8 
Variable no.  of firms  2.66  -0.05  0.82  11.4 
330:  Office Machinery:· 
£=32.8, RS=10%, TS=23.6%, 8=0.120, DC=0.59% 
Fixed no. of firms  I  10.4  -0.98  0.88  8.0 
Variable no.  of firms  12.5  -2.48  1.45  10.7 
342:  Electric ntotors, generators etc: 
£=7  .. 35, RS=I5%, TS=8.8%, 8=0.022, DC=0.22% 
Fixed no.  of firms  I 0.37  -0.06  0.29  19.0 
Variable no.  of firms  0.31  -0.09  0.29  18.4 
346; Electrical Household Appliances: 
f=l0.77, RS=10%, TS=I9.6%, 8=0.110, DC=0.4-,% 
Fixed no.  of firms  I 2.09  -0.32  0.64  14.8 
Variable no.  of firms  2.08  -0.93  0.81  16.7 
350; Motor vehicles: 
£=13.32, RS=l6%, TS=24.8%, 8=0.199, DC=0.62% 
Fixed no.  of firms  I 3.36  -0.56  0.83  17.9 
Variable no.  of firms  3.64  -1.61  1.34  25.6 
438; Carpets, linoleum etc.: 
t=21.4, RS=6%, TS=18.8%, 8=0.031, DC=0.47% 
Fixed •o. of llrlllll  I 2.51  -0.17  0.67  8.0 
Variable no.  of Arms  2.70  -0.49  0.76  7.5 
451!  Footwear• 
f=53.3, RS=2%, TS=27.0%, 8=0.010, DC=0.27% 
Fixed no. of firms  I 3.21  -0.03  0.35  3.1 
Variable no.  of firms  3.44  -0.03  0.40  1.6 -38-
Tnblc i:  Scu~itivit;, Analysis 
Cournol.  Bertrand  I  ----··-- Models constant  Mode  Is  •ariable  Models constant  Models •ariahle 
Fixed no.  Var.  no.  Find no.  Var.  110.  Fixed no.  Var.  no.  Fixed 110.  Var.  no. 
o( firms  of firms  o( firms  o( firms  o( firms  or firms  or firms  of firms 
----
242:  Ccntcnt, litne and plaster: fc = 35.5, Eo  =  8.0, RS=20%, TS= 1.6%, 11=0.066 
6  EC output%  0.24  0.58  0.00  0.10 
..  . - ... -·  .. --- ----
A  nernge cosh %  -0.03  -0.93  -0.00  -0.0 I 
6  wetfnre%consumption  -0.1  0.64  0.04  0.04 
1:..  welfare%6 int-EC trade  -5.0  22.1  11.1  11.1 
~;-7 Pltarrnaceutical products: fc = 5.8,Es = 4.7, R5=22%, TS~-=-1-0-.0-.,%~,~8~=-0-.-0-5-......... _-------
6  EC output%  0.37  0.30  0.46  0.42  0.2  2  0.25  0.27  0.27 
6  ••erase costs %  -0.08  -0.16  -0.02  -0.15  -0.0  5  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03 
4  welfare%cons•mptlon  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.44  0.3  3  0.34  0.36  0.37 
4  welfare%A lnt-BC trade  21.8  22.6  23.1  32.6  29. 2  30.1  31.8  32.7 
280; Artdlctal and •7nthetic ftbree: Ec  =  21.5,Es = 8.7, RS=10%, TS=36.4%, 8=0.050  . . 
ABC output%  4.19  8.61  1.39  2.74 
-~~•era~costs_%  -0.61  -2.46  -0.17  -0.14 
6  weltare%consumptlo11  0.99  1.84  1.21  0.97  ----------
A  welfare%6 lnt-BC trade  13.0  14.0  21.4  9.3 
322; Machine Toole: Ec  =  13.55, EB =  13.24, RS=7%, TS=22.4%, 8=0.004 
6  EC output %  1.67  2.66  2.87  .2.79  1.60 
A  a.-er~ge costs %  -0.12  -0.05  -0.06  -0.04  -0.12  --
6  weltare%consumptlon  0.84  0.82  0.86  0.86  0.85 
6  welfare%A lnt-EC trade  13.8  11.4  11.7  12.1  14.2  .  330; Offtce Machtnery: cc ·= 32.8,ts =  10.9, RS=IO%, TS=23.6%, H=0.12 
A  EC otttput %  10.4  12.5  13.3  12.4  2.64 
6  ftYerage costs%  -0.98  -2.48  -0.49  -1.96  -0.25 
4  welfare%consan1ptlon  0.88  1.45  0.62  1.65  0.92 
t. weU'•ac'r.t. int-EC trade  8.0  10.7  6.4  13.2  17.1 
2.65 
-0.02 
0.83 
11.7 
3.80 
-0.10 
0.98 
16.2 
2.92 
-0.06 
0.86 
11.0 
4.70 
-0.24 
1.14 
16.1 
342; Electric motors, l!!neratore, etc: tc = 7.35,Es = 6.77, RS=16  , TS=8.8  , 8=0.022 
ABC ontp•t%  0.37  0.311 0.41  0.46  0.29  0.[_18  0.30 
6  ftYerace cosh"  -0.05  -o:o9  -0.02  -0.09  -0.06  -0.01  -0.01 
--~ welfare%consumption  0.29  0.29  0.31  0.39  0.31  0.31  0.33 
4  welfare%4 lnt-BC hade  19.0  18.4  20.0  24.9  21.7  21.1  22.3 
346; Electrical Houeehold-Appliance•: Ec  =  10.7,E8  =  7.8, RS=10%, TS;ti.G%, 8=0.11 
ABC output%  2.09  2.08  2.62  3.01  1.29  1.30  1.61 
A  a•erage co1h %  -0.32  -0.93  -0.32  -0.85  -0.20  -0.22  -0.26  --------·-·-·-·-·---·-
A  welfare%con11"mption  0.64  0.81  0.69  1.37  0.72  0.71  0.79  -----------
A  welfAre%A lnt-EC trade  14.8  16.7  12.2  26.7  20.6  17.7  13.9 
0  350; Motor Veluclesa Ec  =  13.3,Es =  7.2, RS=16%, TS=24.8%, H=0.199 
A  EC output %  3.36  3.64  3.70  5.48  1.71  1.90  3.25 
A a•era1e costs %  -0.66  -1.61  -0.28  -1.83  -0.29  -0.41  -0.50 
A  weltare%consumptlon  0.83  1.34  0.76  2.56  0.91  0.89  0.82 
A  weltare%A lat·BC trade  17.9  25.5  16.6  47.8  26.7  21.7  13.3  .  438; Carpete, Unolam, etc.t Ec  =  21.4,Es = 17.8, RS=6%, TS=18.8%, H=0.031 
6  ••era  ..  costs%  -0.17  -0.49  -0.12  -0.08 
A  weltare%c:on••mpUoa  0.87  0.78  0.71  0.74 
A  welfare%  A  lnt-BC trade  8.0  7.5  9.5  8.5 
2.66 
-0.01 
0.84 
11.9 
4.06 
~.10 
1.09 
18.2 
0.31 
-0.02 
0.33 
22.5 
1.65 
-0.21 
0.88 
21.7 
2.42 
-0.41 
1.29 
32.1 
6  BC "',.'"  2.51  2.70 I  1.74  2.21 L 
4&1;--i'o~-weuifc = 53.3,fs = 42.4, RS:2%;T§=27%, u;;o']·i  ·-··---········· ···-----·-·  -----
6  BC o•tp•t%  3.21  3.44  1.93  2.53 
A ••era1e costs %  -0.03  -0.03  0.0  0.22 
-~-~~-'!~!~~~-~~-~~_Ptio~----- 0.36  0.40  0.41  0.38 
A  welfare%6 lnt-8C trade  3.1  1.6  4.0  2.0 -39-
Table S Reduction in Trade Barriers 
Integrated Mftrkcts 
242 Cement, 6n1e and l'laster: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country  ------- ... --~---------·----------....... ·----------
Fixed no. of firms  Variable no.  of firms 
ll output  ll consumers'  ll profit  ll output  l!r.  consumers'  ll number 
%  surplus,  mBCU  mBCU  %  IUrpJus,  miiCU  olfirms 
France  -0.59  66.9  -60.8  -4.37  -6.5  0 
Germany  2.45  88.3  -76.9  -3.73  -3.8  0 
Italy  1.39  33.2  -30.0  0.23  -0.3  0 
U.K.  3.76  60.4  -51.7  -3.66  -2.37  0 
RofEC  1.13  41.8  -38.4  2.48  9.20  0 
EC  1.32  290.6  -267.8  0.03  -14.4  1 
EC aggregates 
ll intra-EC  ll exba-EC  ll extra-EC  ll price%  ll avera1e  ll welfare% 
bade%  exports%  costs%  consumption  impor~!%  (E~  ave) 
Fixed -;.o.  o( ftrn;-- -78.0  0.8  -56.9  -1.81  -0.12  0.22 
Variable no.  o( firms  -43.1  -0.01  5.9  0.09  0.09  -0.1 
257 Pharmaceutical products: (Cournot; models per firm constant)-
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of firms 
------•--A--~~tp;i  ___ ll  c.;~;;~;~;;·-·--6- p-~;fi& -ll o;iP~  A-~~~.~;-;~  ;--6-;u~"b~~- .. 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
RofEC 
EC 
%  surplus,  mECU  mBCU  %  surplus, mBCU  of firms 
1.19  91.8  -68.4  1.59  33.9  -10 
3.10  182.7  -119.5  1.77  82.0  -10 
3.43  113.0  -75.5  3.46  44.7  -10 
3.74  234.5  -154.1  -0.41  123.3  -10 
7.21  104.7  -48.3  5.76  56.5  -5 
3.32  726.7  -465.7  2.13  340.3  -47  ____  ...... ____________  -----------------
EC aggregates 
ll intra-EC  ll extra-EC  ll extra-EC  A price%  ll avera1e  ll welfare% 
trade%  exports%  imports%  (EC ave)  costs%  consumption 
Fixed no.  of ftmu  -16.1  0.0  -15.7  -2.50  -0.63  1.10 
Variable no.  of ftrms  -16.5  -11.5  -7.7  -0.83  -0.83  1.45 -40-
Integrated Markets 
2801 .Artift.cial and Synthetic ft.bre•a  (Cournot; models per ftrm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no. of firms 
A output  A consumers'  A profit  A output  A coft111mers'  4  namber 
%  surplus, mBOU  mBOU  .%  nrplus, mBOU  o(ftrms 
France  80.1  74.7  -0.7  33.7  36.4  1 
Germany  -62.6  7.4  -41.4  -33.0  -12.8  -3 
Italy  13.1  80.2  -34.6  41.7  93.6  -2 
U.K.  63.1  132.4  -30.8  21.7  38.0  1 
RofEC  30.3  67.4  -8.9  4.63  10.4  1 
EC  9.60  352.2  -116.2  7.18  166.6  -1 
ECa  regales 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A anrace  A welfare% 
tr"de%  exp_o~ts%  imports%  (EC ave)  costs%  consumption 
Fixed no.  of lbms  -56.6  -2.6  -67.8  -2.60  -1.77  4:i4--
Variable no.  of ftrms  -48.0  -2.2  -47.5  -1.04  -1.04  2.91 
322 Machine Tool•: (Cournot; models per firm coastaat) 
Productioa aad welfare chaage by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of ftrms  -----
A output  A consumers'  A proftt  A output  A con111111en'  A number 
%  surplus, ntBOU  mBOU  %  surplu, mBOU  of ftrms 
France  0.74  17.8  -1.40  -16.2  12.1  -16 
Germany  3.62  12.3  11.6  18.4  36.2  39 
Italy  0.98  15.9  -3.4  -5.67  10.0  -10 
U.K.  0.32  13.5  -0.90  -5.40  11.0  -12 
RofEC  -0.10  19.6  -3.0  -28.2  9.3  -20 
EC  2.05  79.1  2.9  2.86  78.5  -18  --------------------·-·------ ------
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  A extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A anrase  A welfare% 
&rade%  export.%  Imports%  (EC an)  costs%  consumption 
Fix~d no.  of ftrms  24.6  0.3  -10.0  -0.14  -0.16  0.86 
Variable no.  of firms  29.4  2.6  -10.3  -0.10  -0.10  0.83  --------41-
Integrated ~arkets 
330 Ofllce Machinery: (Cournot; models per ftrm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
·--·--··-- .  ------
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of firms 
~output  ~  conswuers'  ~profit  ~output  ~  COIUUftlerS 
1  6  number 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
RofEC 
EC 
Fixed no.  of firms 
Variable no.  of firms 
%  surplus, mBOO  mBCU  %  surplus, miJCU 
44.2  389.6  -4.5  21.5  187.0 
19.5  145.1  -33.0  15.9  94.4 
15.3  373.3  -32.6  16.3  361.7 
21.3  59.4  -13.1  20.5  34.1 
33.1  213.5  -43.0  61.0  277.4 
27.3  1181.1  -126.2  27.2  954.6 
EC aggregates 
~  intra-EC  ~  extra-EC  ~  extra-EC  ~price%  ~  averase 
--~~de  !'!.___~p.o~~-~-% _  im_!)!!ts%  (EC ave)  costs% 
. -64.0  11.9  -66-.1--~-3.i3...__  ___  2.7i 
-51.0  11.7  -68.2  -2.70  -2.70 
offtrms 
1 
1 
0 
2 
-3 
0 
~welfare% 
consumption 
3·.88--
3.43 
342 Electric motors, generators, etc: (Cournot; models per ftrm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  of firms  ·---------.. 
A output  ~  consumers'  6  profit  6  output  ~  consumers'  6  number 
%  surplus, mECU  mBCU  %  surplus, mECU  of firans 
France  2.21  144.4  -91.6  0.86  54.7  -8 
Germany  0.44  62.0  -32.2  1.54  51.4  -3 
Italy  4.32  77.4  -42.3  -1.08  29.0  -8 
U.K.  1.51  32.3  -14.5  1.09  18.5  -6 
R ofEC  4.69  105.1  -53.1  0.89  37.2  -8 
EC  1.72  421.2  -233.7  1.06  190.8  -32 
EC aggregates 
~  intra-EC  ~  extra-EC  A extra-EC  6  price%  ~  averase  ~welfare% 
trade%  exports%  imports%  (EC an)  costs%  consumption 
Fixed no.  of firms  2.5  0.4  -8.1  -0.83  -0.26  0.52 
Variable ao. of fir11u  4.0  -4.4  -3.8  -1.3  -1.30  0.&3  ··---------- -----·---42-
Integrated MArkets 
348 Electrical hottsehold appliances: (Cournot; models per firm  constant) 
Production and welfare change by country  ....  .,. _____ .. __ ·-··-- ·----- ......  ---·---- ...... - ...  ---·.  .  . --·· --- ·-- - --· ...  ··· ·---·· -- ·····v.ri~t,i~-n-;~-;;(6;.;;-----·-- Fixed no.  o( firms 
A ou&pu&  A cousun1ers'  A profi&  ll outpu&  A consumers'  A number 
%  surplus, mBCU  mBCU  %  1urplus, m&CU  offtrms 
Franc.- 13.6  145.1  -63.3  25.3  185.7  -9 
Germany  1.49  81.9  -52.4  4.34  84.7  -14 
l&aly  -0.81  89.7  -62.6  -0.92  79.6  -13 
U.K.  13.6  52.6  -22.3  15.4  46.0  -14 
RofEC  20.2  100.5  -34.4  26.4  107.9  -8 
EC  8.08  469.9  -234.9  12.7  503.9  -59 
EC a  gre  ates 
A  in&ra-EC 
&rade% 
ll ex&ra-EC  ll extra-EC  ll price%  A averase 
expor&s%  imports %  (EC ave)  costs% 
ll welfare% 
consumption 
--Fix;d-no. o( fir.;;-- -23.0  2.4  -2·iT---2.88-----1."it  1:7_9 __ 
Variable no. of firms  -24.5  -12.6  -23.6  -9.04  -9.04  3.85 
350 Motor Yehicles: (  Cournot; models per firm  constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
France  12.5  2172.4  -389.0  54.4  6105.9  -1 
Germany  -9.7  555.4  -639.5  -12.3  1551.2  -3 
J&aly  29.3  914.3  19.6  59.1  2118.9  -1 
U.K.  35.5  803.6  -86.4  44.2  1463.0  -1 
RofEC  33.0  1353.1  -44.8  57.4  2502.7  -1 
EC  10.5  5798.6  -1140.1  26.4  13741.7  -8  ---·-------·--------------------------------------------------
EC aggregates 
A in&ra-EC  A extra-EC  ll extra-EC  ll price%  A averase  6  welfare% 
trade%  expor&s%  imports%  (EC ave)  costs%  consun1ption 
Fixed no.  of firms  -61.4  2.0  -40.7  -2.58  -1.72  4.09 
Variable ao. of ftrmt  -61.0  -16.7  -63.5  -16.9  -16.9  12.1  --·----------43-
Integrftted ~arkets 
438 Carpets, linoleum etc.: (Cournot; models per firm  constant) 
Production and welfare change by country  --------·----- ---------------- -----·------ -.  -------·---------- --·-------------
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no. of firms 
~output  ~  consumers'  /j. profit  ~output  ~  consumers'  ~number 
%  surplus, mBCU  mECU  %  surplus, mBCU  of firnu 
France  4.12  21.4  -8.0  -24.2  13.0  -18 
Germany  32.9  20.'2  -1.1  30.8  21.6  -7 
Italy  25.9  11.0  -3.7  -3.73  8.0  -9 
U.K.  0.70  20.1  -10.0  -9.67  12.0  -31 
R ofEC  -3.21  1.0  6.9  7.01  20.7  -43 
EC  4.46  73.7  -15.9  4.86  75.4  -109 
EC aggregates 
A intra-EC  6  extra-EC  A extra-EC  A price%  A anrftge  1!1  welfare% 
(EC ave)  costs%  consumption 
-o.so~--_-:-o-.~30~--~o:i-s --
--------_____ ~~de  %  ___  expor~_s_,._, __  bn-'p;;_or~s % 
Fixed no.  of firms  26.7  5.9  -24.3 
y,..,;~~·~ no.  c;f firms  34.9  -4.5  -20.2  -2.79  -2.79  0.97 
451 Footwear: (Cournot; models per firm constant) 
Production and welfare change by country 
Fixed no.  of firms  Variable no.  o{ firms  ---·---- ........  _____  ....... --------- ---· ...  --·--- -- ---- . --- _____ .,. _______ -- --- .. -----· ------------.  .  ..  . ·- .. ------. ·- ------ -- --
A output  fl. consumers'  A profit  A output  A consumers'  A number 
%  surplus, mECU  mECU  %  surpiQs, mECU  of firms 
F1ance  16.4  22.2  -9.7  2.19  18.7  -57 
Gertnany  26.7  17.0  -3.9  -2.58  14.7  -40 
Italy  -15.6  -2.1  1.1  12.2  6.0  -36 
U.K.  18.2  20.4  -9.6  -7.10  14.5  -46 
R ofEC  31.9  20.1  -5.6  -6.82  14.9  -29 
EC  5.53  77.6  -27.6  4.00  68.7  -207  -------·-·· ·---·-··-------··---··-·-----·--- ·------------------------
Fixed no.  o( firms 
Variable no. of ftr1111 
EC aggregates 
A  intra-EC  A extra-EC  fl.  ext.ra-EC 
t.radt"% 
-0.1 
25.5 
uport.s% 
-1.8 
-3.2 
imports% 
-34.7 
-25.1 
A  price%  A average  A  w~lfar~% 
(EC avt')  costs%  consumption 
-0.50  -0.26  0.46 
-1.36  -1.-36  0.64 - 44  --
Tnhle 6; Integrated Markell 
Alf Industries: (Models pt"r  firm eons\ant) 
Cournot 
.~~-~!~·e~~~d  ·-·--- ·-·- _lnt~-~!~~~~  s~gmea~t~d. 
Fixed no.  Var.  no.  Fixed no.  Var.  no.  fo~i ud no.  Var.  no. 
or firms  of firms  of firms  of firms  of firms  of firms 
?.tl?.·  C~tncnt, lintf; and plaster: €c = 35.5,€8 = 8.0, RS=20%, TS=l.G%, H=0.066 
6.  EC output 'r.  0.24  0.58  1.32  0.03  0.00  0.10 
A  nYernse cosh %  -0.03  -0.93 
d  welfare%contttnlptlon  -0.1  0.64 
. -·  . ·-···- -· 
t\  int-EC trftde %  128  180 
A  EC output %  0.37  0.30 
---~- ~~~~~-~~!!  ..  ~---·-- ---- -0.08  -0.15 
A  welfere%eoatump~ioa  0.29  0.30 
A lnt·  BC trade "  13.3  13.3 
-0.12  0.09 
0.22  -0.1 
-78  -43.1 
3.32  2.13 
-0.73  -3.43 
1.11  1.45 
-16.1  -16.6 
-0.0 
0.04 
22.5 
0.22 
-0.05 
0.33 
11.3 
-0.01 
0.04 
22.5 
0.25 
-0.03 
0.34 
11.3 
.  --..  -!~~!-~~!~~~-. . 
Find no.  Var.  no. 
of firms  of firms 
0.01  0.02 
-0.0 
0.04 
16.8 
0.24 
-0.05 
0.33 
8.7 
-0.02 
0.04 
16.8 
0.28 
-0.02 
0.34 
8.7 
280; Artiftcial and 1ynthetic ftbres: £c  =  21.0,fs = 8.0, RS=10%, TS=38.4%, 8=0.050 
--~  ~~~utput  -~- 4.19  6.81  9.59  7.18  1.39  2.74  1.43  2.76 
A aorerase cotta %  -0.51  -2.45  -1.77  -1.04  -0.17  -0.14  -0.18  -0.14 
A  welrare%consumptlon  0.99  1.84  4.14  2.91  1.21  0.97  1.21  0.97 
4  int-BC trade %  20.4  36.9  -56.5  -48.0  15.5  28.8  13.7  27.2 
322; Machine Tools: fc =  13.6, fB  =  13.2, RS=7%, TS=22.4%, H=0.004 
A  BC output %  1.67  2.66 j  2.05  2.86 j  1.60  2.65  11.60  2.65 
d  nerase cosh%  -0.12  -0.05  -0.16  -0.10  -0.12  -0.02  -0.12  -0.01 
-;  __  ~;:;~~~~~s;~:·:"  __  ---- ~7~! --·----~~~~  ____  ;_~:;  ________  ;~~!  ---~~::  _________  ;~~~--- ·- -----~6~! -- ~~~! 
330; Office Macltinery: fc = 32.8,fs =  10.9, RS=10%, TS=23.64)~, 11=0.12 
ABC output%  10.4  12.5  27.3  27.2  2.64  3.80  2.67  3.96 
A ••erase costs %  -0.98  -2.48  -2.71  -2.59  -0.25  -0.10  -0.26  -0.08 
A  welrare%consumpUon  0.88  1.45  3.88  3.43  0.92  0.98  0.91  0.98 
·-- --- -----·  ·----·---
A  int-BC trade %  44.5  57.2  -64.0  -51.0  22.8  25.7  17.5  21.0  .  342; Electrtc ntotors, generators, etc: €C = 7.35,fs = 6.77, RS=15%, TS=8.8%, H=0.0·22 
-~-~~output~----·--____  0.37  0.31  1.72  1.06  0.29  0.28  j  0.30  0.30 
~-~~~ras~~stt_~----.. -- -0.05  -0.09  -0.26  -1.30  -0.05  -0.01  I  -0.05  -0.01 
A  wetrare%contumptlon  0.29  0.29  0.52  0.53  0.31  0.31  I  0.31  0.31 
6  int-BC trade%.  17.3  17.9  2.5  4.0  16.2  16.7  I  14.1  14.6 
3~6; E!ect:-icnlll<inseltold Appliances: €c =  10.7,Es = 7.8, RS=10%, TS=19.6%, 11=0.11 
A  EC Otllpttt%  2.09  2.08  8.08  12.7  1.29  1.30  I  1.33  1.38  ------------ -····- -- ...  ---
A ••erase costs %  -0.32  -0.93  -1.15  -9.04  -0.20  -0.22  -0.19  -0.16 
6  welrare%consumption  0.64  0.81  1.79  3.85  0.72  0.71  0.72  0.72 
6  int-BC trade%  22.1  24.7  -23.0  -24.5  17.8  20.5  9.5  10.9  .  350; Motor Vel11cles: fc =  13.3,fs =  7.2, RS=16%, TS=24.8%, H=0.199 
A  BC CHitput  %  3.36  3.64  10.5  2 
6  ••erase costs %  -0.66  -1.51  -1.72  -I 
A  welrare"eoneumptlon  0.83  1.34  4.09  1 
A  lnt-IIC trade"  18.7  21.2  -61.4  -6  -
6[14  1.71  1.9u  1.67  •.  95 
6.9  -0.29  -0.41  -0.27  -0.13 
2.1  0.91  0.89  0.92  0.9 
1.0  _14.~-----~-5  ___  0_.8 ___  2_.7  __ 
438; Carpet1,1iaoleam, etcs fc = 21.4,fs =  17.6, RS=6%, TS=18.8%, 8=0.031 
ABC output"  2.51  2.70  4.46  4.86  1.74  2.21  1.75  2.22 
-~_!~n~~!!~----- -0.17  -0.49  -0.30  -2.79  -0.12  -0.06  -0.13  -0.06 
-~~~~.!~~C:.~!.!'!!~~.  0.87  0.76  0.75  0.97  0.71  0.74  0.71  0.74 
·6 lnt-BC trade"  45.0  63.7  26.7  34.8  39.6  46.5  39.1  45.9 
451; Footwear: fc =  53.3, E  B  = 42.4, RS=2%, TS=27  .0%, II =0.009 
ABC output%  3.21  3.44  5.53  4.0  1.93  2.53  1.93  2.53  ·----·--------------
0.0  4  ••erase costs %  -0.03  -0.03  -0.26  -1.36  0.2!  0.0  0.22 
A  welrare%eontwmptlo.  0.35  0.40  0.46  0.64  0.41  0.38  0.41  0.38 
A  int-BC trade %  41.4  92.7  0.0  25.5  37.7  70.6  37.6  70.4 -45-
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•  TECHNICAL  APPENDIX 
The  model  underlying  the projections presented in the paper 
is  one  of partial  equilib~ium,  operating at the level of  a  single 
industry.  There  are  a  number  of countries,  indexed by i=l, .. ,I, 
in which  firms  are  located,  and  these countries  also constitute 
separate product markets.  Each  firm  is  assumed  to be  located in 
only one  country  and  the  number  of  firms  active in an  industry in 
country  i  is denoted ni,  all firms  in country  i  being  assumed to 
be  symmetric. 
Product differentiation is permitted,  and  the number  of 
product  types  produced by  a  single one  of  the  country  i  firms  is 
denoted mi.  These  products  are  tradeable,  and xij denotes  the 
quantity of  a  single product  type  produced by  a  firm  in country  i 
and  sold in country  j,  at price pij.  In addition to  the 
industries  under  study,  the  economy  contains  a  perfectly 
competitive sector producing  a  tradeable output under  constant 
returns  to scale;  this is taken  as  the numeraire. 
Demands  in each  country are derived  from  an  aggregate welfare 
function.  It is  assumed  that each country's welfare  function  is 
separable between  the  numeraire  commodity  and  the differentiated 
products,  so  that we  may  construct  a  sub-utility function over 
differentiated products,  this sub-utility function  representing 
the  aggregate quantity of  the  product  consumed.  The  sub-utility 
function  for  country  j  is denoted yj'  and  is  assumed  to be  of  the 
constant elasticity of  substitution  (CES)  form,  as  in Dixit  and 
Stiglitz  [1977].  Consumers  in country  j  may  consume  products 
which  are produced  in each  country,  so  the  number  of product  types 
avail~ble for  consumption  is ~n.mi The  sub-utility function,  or 
1  . -46-
aggregate  volume  index,  is  then 
( 1) 
where  the  aij  are parameters  describing  the preferences  of  a 
consumer  in country  j  for  products  produced in country i.  It is 
then possible  to  show  that the  aggregate price level  of  the 
product  is  given by the  function 
(j=l, .. ,I) 
( 2) 
Demand  in country  j  for  the  aggregate product is  assumed  to 
be  a  function  only of  the  aggregate  product price level  and  to 
have  constant elasticity of  demand  ~  so  that 
-J..l  y.=b.q. 
J  J  J 
( 3 ) 
where  bj  is  a  parameter measuring  the  size of  the market  j,  and it 
then  follows  that demand  for  individual product varieties is given 
by 
-£  -£  £  -~  x. j =a .. ( p ..  I q. )  y. =p .. ai . b. q. 
~  ~]  ~]  J  J  ~]  J  J  J 
( 4) 
Each  type  of differentiated product  is supplied by  a  single  firms 
and all  firms  in  a  particular country are.assumed to be 
symmetric.  The  profits of  a  single  firm  in country  i  may  be 
expressed as 
where  T ..  and  t ..  are  ad  valorem  and  specific costs  associated 
1]  1] 
with selling in market  j.  They  may  be  interpreted either as 
( 5) 
taxes,  or  as  transport costs.  ci  is the  firm's  production cost 
function;  it is  increasing in both output per model,  xi  =  ~xij' 
and  in the  number  of  model  varieties produced,  mi. 
In our base  case  we  assume  that markets  are  internationally 
segmented,  so  firms  may  choose  sales  in each national  market 
separately.  Profit maximisation with  respect to xij  gives  first -47-
order conditions  of  the  form 
1  p .. (1- T .. )(1--)- t  .. 
~J  ~J  e. .  ~J 
~]  =  (i,j=1, .. ,I) 
( 6) 
The  perceived elasticity of  demand,  eij'  depends  on  both the 
elasticity of  demand  for  a  single differentiated product,  and  the 
perceived effect of  the  firm's  action  on  industry aggregate 
supply.  The  latter effect depends  on  the  anticipated response  of 
other  firms  in the  industry;  if it is anticipated that other 
firms  will hold their price constant when  firm  i  alters its price 
(the Bertrand hypothesis),  then it follows  from  the  equations  (5) 
above  that 
eiJ'  = e .. (B)  =  &  - (c:  - .u ) s .. 
1]  ~] 
( 7) 
where sij is the  share of  a  single representative  firm  from 
country  i  in market  j.  If the  anticipated response  is that other 
will hold their sales constant when  firm  i  changes  its sales  (the 
cournot hypothesis),  then  the elasticity is given by 
1  1  =  =  - £ 
(this elasticity being calculated from  the  inverse  demand 
functions  corresponding to equations  (5)  in which  the pij are 
written as  functions  of  the xij  and of  the yj. 
( 8) 
In  some  of  the  cases modelled,  it is assumed  that  in addition 
to  choosing sales of  each model,  each  firm  may  choose  the  number 
of models  it produces.  If a  firm  introduces  a  model,  then  that 
model  will be  sold in all countries.  The  first order condition 
for profit maximisation with  respect to the  number  of  models  is 
then 
oc. 
1 
6m. 
~ 
(i=1, .. ,I) 
( 9 ) 
The  form  of eij depends  on  two  factors.  The  first is the 
perceived reactions  of other  firms.  we  permit  each  firm  to hold 
non-zero  conjectures  about  the  response  of other  firms  to  a  change 
in the  number  of models  produced;  that is,  if a  firm  in country  i -48-
increases  the  number  of  models  it produces  by  1%,  then it 
conjectures that other  firms  will  increase the  number  of  models 
they produce by  wi%.  S·econd,  adding  an  extra model  moves  the 
demand  curves  for  existing models;  the  value of this depends  on 
whether  this shift in demand  effects price or quantity of existing 
models.  If the output  game  is Bertrand,  then we  assume  that price 
is held constant  and quantity changes  as  new  models  enter.  eij is 
then  given by 
e .. 
l.J  = 
£  - J.J 
(10) 
If the output  game  is cournot,  then we  assume  that quantities are 
held constant  and price  changes  as  new  models  enter,  and eij takes 
the  form 
(11) 
This  completes  the characterization of equilibrium for  cases 
in which  the  numbers  of  firms  in each  country are  exogenously 
determined  and markets  are  segmented.  If there is free entry and 
exit of  firms  in each  country then we  have  the additional  industry 
equilibrium conditions  that profits  (equations  (5))  are equal  to 
zero. 
We  also consider  a  case  in which  a  subset of markets  are 
integrated.  In this case  firms  set a  single producer price, 
although  international differnces  in consumer prices  may  remain, 
because of trade costs.  This  removes  the ability of  firms  to 
price discriminate between different markets,  and means  that each 
firm  has  only one  degree  of  freedom  in its pricing.  If pi  denotes 
the price charged by  a  firm  from  country  i  in its home  market, 
then export prices,  pij must  satisfy 
Pi(l  - Tij)  = Pij(1  - Tij)  (i=1, .. ,I;j=1, .. ,K) 
(12) 
where  the  first K markets  are  integrated,  and,  for  simplicity,  we 
assume  that tij=O.  (For  a  detailed comparison of  segmented  and 
integrated markets  see  Markusen  and Venables  [1988]). 
With  this restriction each  firm  has  a  single first order -®-
condition for its choice of  sales  in the  K integrated markets; 
equations  (8)  are  replaced by equations  of  the  form 
= 
(13) 
If behaviour is Bertrand then  firms  set price pi  given the price 
of other  firms,  and  the perceived elasticity Ei  is a  weighted 
average  of  the elasticities of  demand  in the  individual markets 
constituting the  integrated market.  If behaviour is cournot,  each 
firms  chooses  its total sales to the  integrated markets  given the 
total sales of  the other  firm~,  and  each  firm's  output is divided 
up  between  the  individual national markets  making  up  the 
integrated market  so  as  to meet  demand,  given the  fixed price 
relativities.  In this case  the elasticity Ei  is a  complicated 
expression which  is not  given here. 
There  are  two  further  technical points  on which  further 
elaboration may  be helpful:  the choice of  functional  form  of  the 
cost  function,  and  the calculation of  "tariff-equivalent" trade 
barriers. 
The  literature does  not offer clear guidance  on  the 
appropriate  functional  form  for  the cost  function.  There  are  two 
natural  candidates.  The  first is a  linear form  (i.e.,  fixed cost 
plus  constant marginal  cost)  in which  case  returns  to scale become 
exhausted as  firms  become  large.  The  second is log-linear,  in 
which  case  successive  increases  in output are associated with 
continued reductions  in average  and marginai  cost.  We  employ  a 
weighted  average  of  these  functional  forms  so  that costs  are given 
by 
(14) 
Thus  the linear component  of  the cost  function  has  the weight  z, 
and  the  loglinear component  the weight  1-z.  The  values  of  the 
ciparameters  are selected so  that average  cost changes  with 
changes  in xi and mi  in ways  consistent with  the  information 
provided by  Pratten  [1987]. -50-
Finally,  a  note  on  the calculation of "tariff equivalents"  of 
observed  asymmetries  in trade patterns.  It follows  from  (4)  that 
the ratio between  expenditure  in country  j  on  goods  produced  in 
country  i  and  those produced in country  j  is 
Pij xij 
Pjjxjj 
1-.& 
=  aijpij 
1-.& 
aj j Pj j 
(15) 
The  tariff equivalents  are calculated simply as  the tariff rates 
by which  the prices pij would. have  to be  adjusted  (in addition to 
the  10%  transport cost  assumed)  to make  the observed market  shares 
consistent with aij=ajj. 
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